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Fallo de La Haya tema Botnia

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    Invitado comenzó un tema Fallo de La Haya tema Botnia

    Fallo de La Haya tema Botnia

    20 AVRIL 2010
    ARRÊT
    AFFAIRE RELATIVE À DES USINES DE PÂTE À PAPIER
    SUR LE FLEUVE URUGUAY
    (ARGENTINE c. URUGUAY)
    ___________
    CASE CONCERNING PULP MILLS ON THE RIVER URUGUAY
    (ARGENTINA v. URUGUAY)
    20 APRIL 2010
    JUDGMENT
    TABLE OF CONTENTS
    Paragraphs
    CHRONOLOGY OF THE PROCEDURE 1-24
    I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND FACTS OF THE CASE 25-47
    A. Legal framework 26-27
    B. CMB (ENCE) Project 28-36
    C. Orion (Botnia) mill 37-47
    II. SCOPE OF THE COURT’S JURISDICTION 48-66
    III. THE ALLEGED BREACH OF PROCEDURAL OBLIGATIONS 67-158
    A. The links between the procedural obligations and the substantive
    obligations 71-79
    B. The procedural obligations and their interrelation 80-122
    1. The nature and role of CARU 84-93
    2. Uruguay’s obligation to inform CARU 94-111
    3. Uruguay’s obligation to notify the plans to the other party 112-122
    C. Whether the Parties agreed to derogate from the procedural
    obligations set out in the 1975 Statute 123-150
    1. The “understanding” of 2 March 2004 between Argentina
    and Uruguay 125-131
    2. The agreement setting up the High-Level Technical Group
    (the GTAN) 132-150
    D. Uruguay’s obligations following the end of the negotiation period 151-158
    IV. SUBSTANTIVE OBLIGATIONS 159-266
    A. Burden of proof and expert evidence 160-168
    B. Alleged violations of substantive obligations 169-266
    1. The obligation to contribute to the optimum and rational
    utilization of the river (Article 1) 170-177
    2. The obligation to ensure that the management of the soil and
    woodland does not impair the régime of the river or the
    quality of its waters (Article 35) 178-180
    3. The obligation to co-ordinate measures to avoid changes in
    the ecological balance (Article 36) 181-189
    - ii -
    4. The obligation to prevent pollution and preserve the aquatic
    environment (Article 41) 190-202
    (a) Environmental Impact Assessment 203-219
    (i) The siting of the Orion (Botnia) mill at Fray
    Bentos 207-214
    (ii) Consultation of the affected populations 215-219
    (b) Question of the production technology used in the
    Orion (Botnia) mill 220-228
    (c) Impact of the discharges on the quality of the waters
    of the river 229-259
    (i) Dissolved oxygen 238-239
    (ii) Phosphorus 240-250
    (iii) Phenolic substances 251-254
    (iv) Presence of nonylphenols in the river
    environment 255-257
    (v) Dioxins and furans 258-259
    (d) Effects on biodiversity 260-262
    (e) Air pollution 263-264
    (f) Conclusions on Article 41 265
    (g) Continuing obligations: monitoring 266
    V. THE CLAIMS MADE BY THE PARTIES IN THEIR FINAL SUBMISSIONS 267-281
    OPERATIVE CLAUSE 282
    ___________
    ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
    AAP “Autorización Ambiental Previa” (Initial environmental authorization)
    ADCP Acoustic Doppler Current Profiler
    AOX Adsorbable Organic Halogens
    BAT Best Available Techniques (or Technology)
    Botnia “Botnia S.A.” and “Botnia Fray Bentos S.A.” (two companies formed under
    Uruguayan law by the Finnish company Oy Metsä-Botnia AB)
    CARU “Comisión Administradora del Río Uruguay” (Administrative Commission of
    the River Uruguay)
    CIS Cumulative Impact Study (prepared in September 2006 at the request of the
    International Finance Corporation)
    CMB “Celulosas de M’Bopicuá S.A.” (a company formed under Uruguayan law by
    the Spanish company ENCE)
    CMB (ENCE) Pulp mill planned at Fray Bentos by the Spanish company ENCE, which formed
    the Uruguayan company CMB for that purpose
    DINAMA “Dirección Nacional de Medio Ambiente” (National Directorate for the
    Environment of the Uruguayan Government)
    ECF Elemental-Chlorine-Free
    EIA Environmental Impact Assessment
    ENCE “Empresa Nacional de Celulosas de España” (Spanish company which formed
    the company CMB under Uruguayan law)
    ESAP Environmental and Social Action Plan
    GTAN “Grupo Técnico de Alto Nivel” (High-Level Technical Group established in
    2005 by Argentina and Uruguay to resolve their dispute over the CMB (ENCE)
    and Orion (Botnia) mills)
    IFC International Finance Corporation
    IPPC-BAT Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control Reference Document on Best
    Available Techniques in the Pulp and Paper Industry
    MVOTMA “Ministerio de Vivienda, Ordenamiento Territorial y Medio Ambiente”
    (Uruguayan Ministry of Housing, Land Use Planning and Environmental
    Affairs)
    Orion (Botnia) Pulp mill built at Fray Bentos by the Finnish company Oy Metsä-Botnia AB,
    which formed the Uruguayan companies Botnia S.A. and Botnia Fray
    Bentos S.A. for that purpose
    OSE “Obras Sanitarias del Estado” (Uruguay’s State Agency for Sanitary Works)
    POPs Persistent Organic Pollutants
    PROCEL “Plan de Monitoreo de la Calidad Ambiental en el Río Uruguay en Áreas de
    Plantas Celulósicas” (Plan for monitoring water quality in the area of the pulp
    mills set up under CARU)
    PROCON “Programa de Calidad de Aguas y Control de la Contaminación del Río
    Uruguay” (Water quality and pollution control programme set up under CARU)
    ___________
    INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
    YEAR 2010
    2010
    20 April
    General List
    No. 135
    20 April 2010
    CASE CONCERNING PULP MILLS ON THE RIVER URUGUAY
    (ARGENTINA v. URUGUAY)
    Legal framework and facts of the case.
    1961 Treaty of Montevideo — 1975 Statute of the River Uruguay ⎯ Establishment of the
    Administrative Commission of the River Uruguay (CARU) ⎯ CMB (ENCE) pulp mill project ⎯
    Orion (Botnia) pulp mill project ⎯ Port terminal at Nueva Palmira — Subject of the dispute.
    *
    Scope of the Court’s jurisdiction.
    Compromissory clause (Article 60 of the 1975 Statute) — Provisions of the 1975 Statute and
    jurisdiction ratione materiae — Lack of jurisdiction for the Court to consider allegations
    concerning noise and visual pollution or bad odours (Article 36 of the 1975 Statute) — Air
    pollution and impact on the quality of the waters of the river addressed under substantive
    obligations.
    Article 1 of the 1975 Statute — Definition of the purpose of the 1975 Statute — Joint
    machinery necessary for the optimum and rational utilization of the river — Significance of the
    reference to the “rights and obligations arising from treaties and other international agreements in
    force for each of the parties” — Original Spanish text — Statute adopted by the parties in
    observance of their respective international commitments.
    - 2 -
    Article 41 (a) of the 1975 Statute — Original Spanish text — Absence of a “referral clause”
    having the effect of incorporating within the ambit of the Statute the obligations of the parties
    under international agreements and other norms envisaged in the Statute — Obligation for the
    parties to exercise their regulatory powers, in conformity with applicable international
    agreements, for the protection and preservation of the aquatic environment of the
    River Uruguay — Rules for interpreting the 1975 Statute — Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on
    the Law of Treaties — Distinction between taking account of other international rules in the
    interpretation of the 1975 Statute and the scope of the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 60 of
    the latter.
    *
    Alleged breach of procedural obligations.
    Question of links between the procedural obligations and the substantive obligations —
    Object and purpose of the 1975 Statute — Optimum and rational utilization of the
    River Uruguay — Sustainable development — Co-operation between the parties in jointly
    managing the risks of damage to the environment — Existence of a functional link, in regard to
    prevention, between the procedural obligations and the substantive obligations — Responsibility in
    the event of breaches of either category.
    Interrelation of the various procedural obligations laid down by Articles 7 to 12 of the 1975
    Statute — Original Spanish text of Article 7 — Obligation to inform, notify and negotiate as an
    appropriate means of achieving the objective of optimum and rational utilization of the river as a
    shared resource — Legal personality of CARU — Central role of CARU in the joint management of
    the river and obligation of the parties to co-operate.
    Obligation to inform CARU (Article 7, first paragraph, of the 1975 Statute) — Works subject
    to this obligation — Link between the obligation to inform CARU, co-operation between the parties
    and the obligation of prevention — Determination by CARU on a preliminary basis of whether
    there is a risk of significant damage to the other party — Content of the information to be
    transmitted to CARU — Obligation to inform CARU before issuing of the initial environmental
    authorization — Provision of information to CARU by private operators cannot substitute for the
    obligation to inform laid down by the 1975 Statute — Breach by Uruguay of the obligation to
    inform CARU.
    Obligation to notify the plans to the other party (Article 7, second and third paragraphs, of
    the 1975 Statute) — Need for a full environmental impact assessment (EIA) — Notification of the
    EIA to the other party, through CARU, before any decision on the environmental viability of the
    plan — Breach by Uruguay of the obligation to notify the plans to Argentina.
    Question of whether the Parties agreed to derogate from the procedural obligations —
    “Understanding” of 2 March 2004 — Content and scope — Since Uruguay did not comply with it,
    the “understanding” cannot be regarded as having had the effect of exempting Uruguay from
    compliance with the procedural obligations — Agreement setting up the High-Level Technical
    - 3 -
    Group (GTAN) — Referral to the Court on the basis of Article 12 or Article 60 of the 1975 Statute:
    no practical distinction — The agreement to set up the GTAN had the aim of enabling the
    negotiations provided for in Article 12 of the 1975 Statute to take place, but did not derogate from
    other procedural obligations — In accepting the creation of the GTAN, Argentina did not give up
    the procedural rights belonging to it by virtue of the Statute, nor the possibility of invoking
    Uruguay’s responsibility; nor did Argentina consent to suspending the operation of the procedural
    provisions of the Statute (Article 57 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties) —
    Obligation to negotiate in good faith — “No construction obligation” during the negotiation
    period — Preliminary work approved by Uruguay — Breach by Uruguay of the obligation to
    negotiate laid down by Article 12 of the 1975 Statute.
    Obligations of Uruguay following the end of the negotiation period — Scope of Article 12 of
    the 1975 Statute — Absence of a “no construction obligation” following the end of the negotiation
    period and during the judicial settlement phase.
    *
    Alleged breaches of substantive obligations.
    Burden of proof — Precautionary approach without reversal of the burden of proof —
    Expert evidence — Reports commissioned by the Parties — Independence of experts —
    Consideration of the facts by the Court — Experts appearing as counsel at the hearings —
    Question of witnesses, experts and expert witnesses.
    Optimum and rational utilization of the River Uruguay — Article 1 of the 1975 Statute sets
    out the purpose of the instrument and does not lay down specific rights and obligations —
    Obligation to comply with the obligations prescribed by the Statute for the protection of the
    environment and the joint management of the river — Regulatory function of CARU —
    Interconnectedness between equitable and reasonable utilization of the river as a shared resource
    and the balance between economic development and environmental protection that is the essence
    of sustainable development (Article 27 of the 1975 Statute).
    Obligation to ensure that the management of the soil and woodland does not impair the
    régime of the river or the quality of its waters (Article 35 of the 1975 Statute) — Contentions of
    Argentina not established.
    Obligation to co-ordinate measures to avoid changes to the ecological balance (Article 36 of
    the 1975 Statute) — Requirement of individual action by each party and co-ordination through
    CARU — Obligation of due diligence — Argentina has not convincingly demonstrated that
    Uruguay has refused to engage in the co-ordination envisaged by Article 36 of the 1975 Statute.
    Obligation to prevent pollution and preserve the aquatic environment — Normative content
    of Article 41 of the 1975 Statute — Obligation for each party to adopt rules and measures to
    protect and preserve the aquatic environment and, in particular, to prevent pollution — The rules
    and measures prescribed by each party must be in accordance with applicable international
    agreements and in keeping, where relevant, with the guidelines and recommendations of
    - 4 -
    international technical bodies — Due diligence obligation to prescribe rules and measures and to
    apply them — Definition of pollution given in Article 40 of the 1975 Statute — Regulatory action of
    CARU (Article 56 of the 1975 Statute), complementing that of each party — CARU Digest — Rules
    by which the existence of any harmful effects is to be determined: 1975 Statute, CARU Digest,
    domestic law of each party within the limits prescribed by the 1975 Statute.
    Environmental impact assessment (EIA) — Obligation to conduct an EIA — Scope and
    content of the EIA — Referral to domestic law — Question of the choice of mill site as part of the
    EIA — The Court is not convinced by Argentina’s argument that an assessment of possible sites
    was not carried out — Receiving capacity of the river at Fray Bentos and reverse flows — The
    CARU water quality standards take account of the geomorphological and hydrological
    characteristics of the river and the receiving capacity of its waters — Question of consultation of
    the affected populations as part of the EIA — No legal obligation to consult the affected
    populations arises from the instruments invoked by Argentina — Consultation by Uruguay of the
    affected populations did indeed take place.
    Production technology used in the Orion (Botnia) mill — No evidence to support Argentina’s
    claim that the Orion (Botnia) mill is not BAT-compliant in terms of the discharges of effluent for
    each tonne of pulp produced — From the data collected after the start-up of the Orion (Botnia)
    mill, it does not appear that the discharges from it have exceeded the prescribed limits.
    Impact of the discharges on the quality of the waters of the river — Post-operational
    monitoring — Dissolved oxygen — Phosphorus — Algal blooms — Phenolic substances —
    Presence of nonylphenols in the river environment — Dioxins and furans — Alleged breaches not
    established.
    Effects on biodiversity — Insufficient evidence to conclude that Uruguay breached the
    obligation to protect the aquatic environment, including its fauna and flora.
    Air pollution — Indirect pollution from deposits into the aquatic environment — Insufficient
    evidence.
    On the basis of the evidence submitted, no breach by Uruguay of Article 41 of the
    1975 Statute.
    Continuing obligations: monitoring — Obligation of the Parties to enable CARU to exercise
    on a continuous basis the powers conferred on it by the 1975 Statute — Obligation of Uruguay to
    continue monitoring the operation of the Orion (Botnia) plant — Obligation of the Parties to
    continue their co-operation through CARU.
    *
    - 5 -
    Claims made by the Parties in their final submissions.
    Claims of Argentina — Breach of procedural obligations — Finding of wrongful conduct
    and satisfaction — Forms of reparation other than compensation not excluded by the
    1975 Statute — Restitution as a form of reparation for injury — Definition — Limits — Form of
    reparation appropriate to the injury suffered, taking into account the nature of the wrongful act —
    Restitution in the form of the dismantling of the Orion (Botnia) mill not appropriate where only
    breaches of procedural obligations have occurred — No breach of substantive obligations and
    rejection of Argentina’s other claims — No special circumstances requiring the ordering of
    assurances and guarantees of non-repetition.
    Uruguay’s request for confirmation of its right to continue operating the Orion (Botnia)
    plant — No practical significance.
    *
    Obligation of the Parties to co-operate with each other, on the terms set out in the
    1975 Statute, to ensure the achievement of its object and purpose — Joint action of the Parties
    through CARU and establishment of a real community of interests and rights in the management of
    the River Uruguay and in the protection of its environment.
    JUDGMENT
    Present: Vice-President TOMKA, Acting President; Judges KOROMA, AL-KHASAWNEH,
    SIMMA, ABRAHAM, KEITH, SEPÚLVEDA-AMOR, BENNOUNA, SKOTNIKOV,
    CANÇADO TRINDADE, YUSUF, GREENWOOD; Judges ad hoc TORRES BERNÁRDEZ,
    VINUESA; Registrar COUVREUR.
    In the case concerning pulp mills on the River Uruguay,
    between
    the Argentine Republic,
    represented by
    H.E. Ms Susana Ruiz Cerutti, Ambassador, Legal Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
    International Trade and Worship,
    as Agent;
    - 6 -
    H.E. Mr. Horacio A. Basabe, Ambassador, Director of the Argentine Institute for Foreign
    Service, former Legal Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and
    Worship, Member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration,
    H.E. Mr. Santos Goñi Marenco, Ambassador of the Argentine Republic to the Kingdom of
    the Netherlands,
    as Co-Agents;
    Mr. Alain Pellet, Professor at the University of Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense, member
    and former Chairman of the International Law Commission, associate member of the
    Institut de droit international,
    Mr. Philippe Sands, Q.C., Professor of International Law at University College London,
    Barrister at Matrix Chambers, London,
    Mr. Marcelo Kohen, Professor of International Law at the Graduate Institute of International
    and Development Studies, Geneva, associate member of the Institut de droit international,
    Ms Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Professor of International Law at the University of
    Geneva,
    Mr. Alan Béraud, Minister at the Embassy of the Argentine Republic to the European Union,
    former Legal Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and
    Worship,
    Mr. Daniel Müller, Researcher at the Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN),
    University of Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
    as Counsel and Advocates;
    Mr. Homero Bibiloni, Federal Secretary for the Environment and Sustainable Development,
    as Governmental Authority;
    Mr. Esteban Lyons, National Director of Environmental Control, Secretariat of the
    Environment and Sustainable Development,
    Mr. Howard Wheater, Ph.D. in Hydrology from Bristol University, Professor of Hydrology
    at Imperial College and Director of the Imperial College Environment Forum,
    Mr. Juan Carlos Colombo, Ph.D. in Oceanography from the University of Quebec, Professor
    at the Faculty of Sciences and Museum of the National University of La Plata, Director of
    the Laboratory of Environmental Chemistry and Biogeochemistry at the National
    University of La Plata,
    Mr. Neil McIntyre, Ph.D. in Environmental Engineering, Senior Lecturer in Hydrology at
    Imperial College London,
    - 7 -
    Ms Inés Camilloni, Ph.D. in Atmospheric Sciences, Professor of Atmospheric Sciences in
    the Faculty of Sciences of the University of Buenos Aires, Senior Researcher at the
    National Research Council (CONICET),
    Mr. Gabriel Raggio, Doctor in Technical Sciences of the Swiss Federal Institute of
    Technology Zurich (ETHZ) (Switzerland), Independent Consultant,
    as Scientific Advisers and Experts;
    Mr. Holger Martinsen, Minister at the Office of the Legal Adviser, Ministry of Foreign
    Affairs, International Trade and Worship,
    Mr. Mario Oyarzábal, Embassy Counsellor, member of the Office of the Legal Adviser,
    Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Worship,
    Mr. Fernando Marani, Second Secretary, Embassy of the Argentine Republic in the
    Kingdom of the Netherlands,
    Mr. Gabriel Herrera, Embassy Secretary, member of the Office of the Legal Adviser,
    Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Worship,
    Ms Cynthia Mulville, Embassy Secretary, member of the Office of the Legal Adviser,
    Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Worship,
    Ms Kate Cook, Barrister at Matrix Chambers, London, specializing in environmental law
    and law relating to development,
    Ms Mara Tignino, Ph.D. in Law, Researcher at the University of Geneva,
    Mr. Magnus Jesko Langer, teaching and research assistant, Graduate Institute of
    International and Development Studies, Geneva,
    as Legal Advisers,
    and
    the Eastern Republic of Uruguay,
    represented by
    H.E. Mr. Carlos Gianelli, Ambassador of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay to the United
    States of America,
    as Agent;
    H.E. Mr. Carlos Mora Medero, Ambassador of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay to the
    Kingdom of the Netherlands,
    as Co-Agent;
    - 8 -
    Mr. Alan Boyle, Professor of International Law at the University of Edinburgh, Member of
    the English Bar,
    Mr. Luigi Condorelli, Professor at the Faculty of Law, University of Florence,
    Mr. Lawrence H. Martin, Foley Hoag LLP, Member of the Bars of the United States
    Supreme Court, the District of Columbia and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
    Mr. Stephen C. McCaffrey, Professor at the McGeorge School of Law, University of the
    Pacific, California, former Chairman of the International Law Commission and Special
    Rapporteur for the Commission’s work on the law of non-navigational uses of
    international watercourses,
    Mr. Alberto Pérez Pérez, Professor in the Faculty of Law, University of the Republic,
    Montevideo,
    Mr. Paul S. Reichler, Foley Hoag LLP, Member of the Bars of the United States Supreme
    Court and the District of Columbia,
    as Counsel and Advocates;
    Mr. Marcelo Cousillas, Legal Counsel at the National Directorate for the Environment,
    Ministry of Housing, Land Use Planning and Environmental Affairs,
    Mr. César Rodriguez Zavalla, Chief of Cabinet, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
    Mr. Carlos Mata, Deputy Director of Legal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
    Mr. Marcelo Gerona, Counsellor at the Embassy of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay in the
    Kingdom of the Netherlands,
    Mr. Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga, Attorney at law, admitted to the Bar of the Eastern
    Republic of Uruguay and Member of the Bar of New York,
    Mr. Adam Kahn, Foley Hoag LLP, Member of the Bar of the Commonwealth of
    Massachusetts,
    Mr. Andrew Loewenstein, Foley Hoag LLP, Member of the Bar of the Commonwealth of
    Massachusetts,
    Ms Analia Gonzalez, LL.M., Foley Hoag LLP, admitted to the Bar of the Eastern Republic
    of Uruguay,
    Ms Clara E. Brillembourg, Foley Hoag LLP, Member of the Bars of the District of Columbia
    and New York,
    Ms Cicely Parseghian, Foley Hoag LLP, Member of the Bar of the Commonwealth of
    Massachusetts,
    Mr. Pierre Harcourt, Ph.D. candidate, University of Edinburgh,
    - 9 -
    Mr. Paolo Palchetti, Associate Professor at the School of Law, University of Macerata,
    Ms Maria E. Milanes-Murcia, M.A., LL.M., J.S.D. Candidate at the McGeorge School of
    Law, University of the Pacific, California, Ph.D. Candidate, University of Murcia,
    admitted to the Bar of Spain,
    as Assistant Counsel;
    Ms Alicia Torres, National Director for the Environment at the Ministry of Housing, Land Use
    Planning and Environmental Affairs
    Mr. Eugenio Lorenzo, Technical Consultant for the National Directorate for the Environment,
    Ministry of Housing, Land Use Planning and Environmental Affairs,
    Mr. Cyro Croce, Technical Consultant for the National Directorate for the Environment,
    Ministry of Housing, Land Use Planning and Environmental Affairs,
    Ms Raquel Piaggio, State Agency for Sanitary Works (OSE), Technical Consultant for the
    National Directorate for the Environment, Ministry of Housing, Land Use Planning and
    Environmental Affairs,
    Mr. Charles A. Menzie, Ph.D., Principal Scientist and Director of the EcoSciences Practice at
    Exponent, Inc., Alexandria, Virginia,
    Mr. Neil McCubbin, Eng., B.Sc. (Eng.), 1st Class Honours, Glasgow, Associate of the Royal
    College of Science and Technology, Glasgow,
    as Scientific Advisers and Experts,
    THE COURT,
    composed as above,
    after deliberation,
    delivers the following Judgment:
    1. On 4 May 2006, the Argentine Republic (hereinafter “Argentina”) filed in the Registry of
    the Court an Application instituting proceedings against the Eastern Republic of Uruguay
    (hereinafter “Uruguay”) in respect of a dispute concerning the breach, allegedly committed by
    Uruguay, of obligations under the Statute of the River Uruguay (United Nations, Treaty Series
    (UNTS), Vol. 1295, No. I-21425, p. 340), a treaty signed by Argentina and Uruguay at Salto
    (Uruguay) on 26 February 1975 and having entered into force on 18 September 1976 (hereinafter
    the “1975 Statute”); in the Application, Argentina stated that this breach arose out of “the
    authorization, construction and future commissioning of two pulp mills on the River Uruguay”,
    with reference in particular to “the effects of such activities on the quality of the waters of the River
    Uruguay and on the areas affected by the river”.
    In its Application, Argentina, referring to Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Court,
    seeks to found the jurisdiction of the Court on Article 60, paragraph 1, of the 1975 Statute.
    - 10 -
    2. Pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court, the Registrar
    communicated the Application forthwith to the Government of Uruguay. In accordance with
    paragraph 3 of that Article, the Secretary-General of the United Nations was notified of the filing
    of the Application.
    3. On 4 May 2006, immediately after the filing of the Application, Argentina also submitted
    a request for the indication of provisional measures based on Article 41 of the Statute and
    Article 73 of the Rules of Court. In accordance with Article 73, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court,
    the Registrar transmitted a certified copy of this request forthwith to the Government of Uruguay.
    4. On 2 June 2006, Uruguay transmitted to the Court a CD-ROM containing the electronic
    version of two volumes of documents relating to the Argentine request for the indication of
    provisional measures, entitled “Observations of Uruguay” (of which paper copies were
    subsequently received); a copy of these documents was immediately sent to Argentina.
    5. On 2 June 2006, Argentina transmitted to the Court various documents, including a video
    recording, and, on 6 June 2006, it transmitted further documents; copies of each series of
    documents were immediately sent to Uruguay.
    6. On 6 and 7 June 2006, various communications were received from the Parties, whereby
    each Party presented the Court with certain observations on the documents submitted by the other
    Party. Uruguay objected to the production of the video recording submitted by Argentina. The
    Court decided not to authorize the production of that recording at the hearings.
    7. Since the Court included upon the Bench no judge of the nationality of the Parties, each of
    them exercised its right under Article 31, paragraph 3, of the Statute to choose a judge
    ad hoc to sit in the case. Argentina chose Mr. Raúl Emilio Vinuesa, and Uruguay chose
    Mr. Santiago Torres Bernárdez.
    8. By an Order of 13 July 2006, the Court, having heard the Parties, found “that the
    circumstances, as they [then] present[ed] themselves to [it], [we]re not such as to require the
    exercise of its power under Article 41 of the Statute to indicate provisional measures”.
    9. By another Order of the same date, the Court, taking account of the views of the Parties,
    fixed 15 January 2007 and 20 July 2007, respectively, as the time-limits for the filing of a
    Memorial by Argentina and a Counter-Memorial by Uruguay; those pleadings were duly filed
    within the time-limits so prescribed.
    10. On 29 November 2006, Uruguay, invoking Article 41 of the Statute and Article 73 of the
    Rules of Court, in turn submitted a request for the indication of provisional measures. In
    accordance with Article 73, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court, the Registrar transmitted a certified
    copy of this request forthwith to the Argentine Government.
    - 11 -
    11. On 14 December 2006, Uruguay transmitted to the Court a volume of documents
    concerning the request for the indication of provisional measures, entitled “Observations of
    Uruguay”; a copy of these documents was immediately sent to Argentina.
    12. On 18 December 2006, before the opening of the oral proceedings, Argentina transmitted
    to the Court a volume of documents concerning Uruguay’s request for the indication of provisional
    measures; the Registrar immediately sent a copy of these documents to the Government of
    Uruguay.
    13. By an Order of 23 January 2007, the Court, having heard the Parties, found “that the
    circumstances, as they [then] present[ed] themselves to [it], [we]re not such as to require the
    exercise of its power under Article 41 of the Statute to indicate provisional measures”.
    14. By an Order of 14 September 2007, the Court, taking account of the agreement of the
    Parties and of the circumstances of the case, authorized the submission of a Reply by Argentina
    and a Rejoinder by Uruguay, and fixed 29 January 2008 and 29 July 2008 as the respective
    time-limits for the filing of those pleadings. The Reply of Argentina and the Rejoinder of Uruguay
    were duly filed within the time-limits so prescribed.
    15. By letters dated 16 June 2009 and 17 June 2009 respectively, the Governments of
    Uruguay and Argentina notified the Court that they had come to an agreement for the purpose of
    producing new documents pursuant to Article 56 of the Rules of Court. By letters of 23 June 2009,
    the Registrar informed the Parties that the Court had decided to authorize them to proceed as they
    had agreed. The new documents were duly filed within the agreed time-limit.
    16. On 15 July 2009, each of the Parties, as provided for in the agreement between them and
    with the authorization of the Court, submitted comments on the new documents produced by the
    other Party. Each Party also filed documents in support of these comments.
    17. In accordance with Article 53, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court, the Court decided,
    after ascertaining the views of the Parties, that copies of the pleadings and documents annexed
    would be made available to the public as from the opening of the oral proceedings.
    18. By letter of 15 September 2009, Uruguay, referring to Article 56, paragraph 4, of the
    Rules of Court and to Practice Direction IXbis, communicated documents to the Court, forming
    part of publications readily available, on which it intended to rely during the oral proceedings.
    Argentina made no objection with regard to these documents.
    19. By letter of 25 September 2009, the Argentine Government, referring to Article 56 of the
    Rules of Court and to Practice Direction IX, paragraph 2, sent new documents to the Registry
    which it wished to produce. By letter of 28 September 2009, the Government of Uruguay informed
    the Court that it was opposed to the production of these documents. It further indicated that if,
    - 12 -
    nevertheless, the Court decided to admit the documents in question into the record of the case, it
    would present comments on them and submit documents in support of those comments. By letters
    dated 28 September 2009, the Registrar informed the Parties that the Court did not consider the
    production of the new documents submitted by the Argentine Government to be necessary within
    the meaning of Article 56, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court, and that it had not moreover
    identified any exceptional circumstance (Practice Direction IX, paragraph 3) which justified their
    production at that stage of the proceedings.
    20. Public hearings were held between 14 September 2009 and 2 October 2009, at which the
    Court heard the oral arguments and replies of:
    For Argentina: H.E. Ms Susana Ruiz Cerutti,
    Mr. Alain Pellet,
    Mr. Philippe Sands,
    Mr. Howard Wheater,
    Ms Laurence Boisson de Chazournes,
    Mr. Marcelo Kohen,
    Mr. Alan Béraud,
    Mr. Juan Carlos Colombo,
    Mr. Daniel Müller.
    For Uruguay: H.E. Mr. Carlos Gianelli,
    Mr. Alan Boyle,
    Mr. Paul S. Reichler,
    Mr. Neil McCubbin,
    Mr. Stephen C. McCaffrey,
    Mr. Lawrence H. Martin,
    Mr. Luigi Condorelli.
    21. At the hearings, Members of the Court put questions to the Parties, to which replies were
    given orally and in writing, in accordance with Article 61, paragraph 4, of the Rules of Court.
    Pursuant to Article 72 of the Rules of Court, one of the Parties submitted written comments on a
    written reply provided by the other and received after the closure of the oral proceedings.
    *
    22. In its Application, the following claims were made by Argentina:
    “On the basis of the foregoing statement of facts and law, Argentina, while
    reserving the right to supplement, amend or modify the present Application in the
    course of the subsequent procedure, requests the Court to adjudge and declare:
    1. that Uruguay has breached the obligations incumbent upon it under the
    1975 Statute and the other rules of international law to which that instrument
    refers, including but not limited to:
    - 13 -
    (a) the obligation to take all necessary measures for the optimum and rational
    utilization of the River Uruguay;
    (b) the obligation of prior notification to CARU and to Argentina;
    (c) the obligation to comply with the procedures prescribed in Chapter II of the
    1975 Statute;
    (d) the obligation to take all necessary measures to preserve the aquatic
    environment and prevent pollution and the obligation to protect biodiversity
    and fisheries, including the obligation to prepare a full and objective
    environmental impact study;
    (e) the obligation to co-operate in the prevention of pollution and the protection of
    biodiversity and of fisheries; and
    2. that, by its conduct, Uruguay has engaged its international responsibility to
    Argentina;
    3. that Uruguay shall cease its wrongful conduct and comply scrupulously in future
    with the obligations incumbent upon it; and
    4. that Uruguay shall make full reparation for the injury caused by its breach of the
    obligations incumbent upon it.
    Argentina reserves the right to amplify or amend these requests at a subsequent
    stage of the proceedings.”
    23. In the written proceedings, the following submissions were presented by the Parties:
    On behalf of the Government of Argentina,
    in the Memorial:
    “For all the reasons described in this Memorial, the Argentine Republic requests
    the International Court of Justice:
    1. to find that by unilaterally authorizing the construction of the CMB and Orion pulp
    mills and the facilities associated with the latter on the left bank of the River
    Uruguay, in breach of the obligations resulting from the Statute of
    26 February 1975, the Eastern Republic of Uruguay has committed the
    internationally wrongful acts set out in Chapters IV and V of this Memorial, which
    entail its international responsibility;
    2. to adjudge and declare that, as a result, the Eastern Republic of Uruguay must:
    (i) cease immediately the internationally wrongful acts referred to above;
    (ii) resume strict compliance with its obligations under the Statute of the River
    Uruguay of 1975;
    - 14 -
    (iii) re-establish on the ground and in legal terms the situation that existed before
    the internationally wrongful acts referred to above were committed;
    (iv) pay compensation to the Argentine Republic for the damage caused by these
    internationally wrongful acts that would not be remedied by that situation
    being restored, of an amount to be determined by the Court at a subsequent
    stage of these proceedings;
    (v) provide adequate guarantees that it will refrain in future from preventing the
    Statute of the River Uruguay of 1975 from being applied, in particular the
    consultation procedure established by Chapter II of that Treaty.
    The Argentine Republic reserves the right to supplement or amend these
    submissions should the need arise, in the light of the development of the situation.
    This would in particular apply if Uruguay were to aggravate the dispute1, for example
    if the Orion mill were to be commissioned before the end of these proceedings.”
    ___________
    1See the Order of the Court of 13 July 2006 on Argentina’s request for the indication of
    provisional measures, para. 82.
    in the Reply:
    “For all the reasons described in its Memorial, which it fully stands by, and in
    the present Reply, the Argentine Republic requests the International Court of Justice:
    1. to find that by authorizing
    ⎯ the construction of the CMB mill;
    ⎯ the construction and commissioning of the Orion mill and its associated
    facilities on the left bank of the River Uruguay,
    the Eastern Republic of Uruguay has violated the obligations incumbent on it under
    the Statute of the River Uruguay of 26 February 1975 and has engaged its
    international responsibility;
    2. to adjudge and declare that, as a result, the Eastern Republic of Uruguay must:
    (i) resume strict compliance with its obligations under the Statute of the River
    Uruguay of 1975;
    (ii) cease immediately the internationally wrongful acts by which it has engaged
    its responsibility;
    (iii) re-establish on the ground and in legal terms the situation that existed before
    these internationally wrongful acts were committed;
    (iv) pay compensation to the Argentine Republic for the damage caused by these
    internationally wrongful acts that would not be remedied by that situation
    being restored, of an amount to be determined by the Court at a subsequent
    stage of these proceedings;
    - 15 -
    (v) provide adequate guarantees that it will refrain in future from preventing the
    Statute of the River Uruguay of 1975 from being applied, in particular the
    consultation procedure established by Chapter II of that Treaty.
    The Argentine Republic reserves the right to supplement or amend these
    submissions should the need arise, in the light of subsequent developments in the
    case.”
    On behalf of the Government of Uruguay,
    in the Counter-Memorial:
    “On the basis of the facts and arguments set out above, and reserving its right to
    supplement or amend these Submissions, Uruguay requests that the Court adjudge and
    declare that the claims of Argentina are rejected.”
    In the Rejoinder:
    “Based on all the above, it can be concluded that:
    (a) Argentina has not demonstrated any harm, or risk of harm, to the river or its
    ecosystem resulting from Uruguay’s alleged violations of its substantive
    obligations under the 1975 Statute that would be sufficient to warrant the
    dismantling of the Botnia plant;
    (b) the harm to the Uruguayan economy in terms of lost jobs and revenue would be
    substantial;
    (c) in light of points (a) and (b), the remedy of tearing the plant down would therefore
    be disproportionately onerous, and should not be granted;
    (d) if the Court finds, notwithstanding all the evidence to the contrary, that Uruguay
    has violated its procedural obligations to Argentina, it can issue a declaratory
    judgment to that effect, which would constitute an adequate form of satisfaction;
    (e) if the Court finds, notwithstanding all the evidence to the contrary, that the plant is
    not in complete compliance with Uruguay’s obligation to protect the river or its
    aquatic environment, the Court can order Uruguay to take whatever additional
    protective measures are necessary to ensure that the plant conforms to the Statute’s
    substantive requirements;
    (f) if the Court finds, notwithstanding all the evidence to the contrary, that Uruguay
    has actually caused damage to the river or to Argentina, it can order Uruguay to
    pay Argentina monetary compensation under Articles 42 and 43 of the Statute;
    and
    (g) the Court should issue a declaration making clear the Parties are obligated to
    ensure full respect for all the rights in dispute in this case, including Uruguay’s
    right to continue operating the Botnia plant in conformity with the provisions of
    the 1975 Statute.
    - 16 -
    Submissions
    On the basis of the facts and arguments set out above, and reserving its right to
    supplement or amend these Submissions, Uruguay requests that the Court adjudge and
    declare that the claims of Argentina are rejected, and Uruguay’s right to continue
    operating the Botnia plant in conformity with the provisions of the 1975 Statute is
    affirmed.”
    24. At the oral proceedings, the following final submissions were presented by the Parties:
    On behalf of the Government of Argentina,
    at the hearing of 29 September 2009:
    “For all the reasons described in its Memorial, in its Reply and in the oral
    proceedings, which it fully stands by, the Argentine Republic requests the
    International Court of Justice:
    1. to find that by authorizing
    ⎯ the construction of the ENCE mill;
    ⎯ the construction and commissioning of the Botnia mill and its associated facilities
    on the left bank of the River Uruguay,
    the Eastern Republic of Uruguay has violated the obligations incumbent on it under
    the Statute of the River Uruguay of 26 February 1975 and has engaged its
    international responsibility;
    2. to adjudge and declare that, as a result, the Eastern Republic of Uruguay must:
    (i) resume strict compliance with its obligations under the Statute of the River
    Uruguay of 1975;
    (ii) cease immediately the internationally wrongful acts by which it has engaged
    its responsibility;
    (iii) re-establish on the ground and in legal terms the situation that existed before
    these internationally wrongful acts were committed;
    (iv) pay compensation to the Argentine Republic for the damage caused by these
    internationally wrongful acts that would not be remedied by that situation
    being restored, of an amount to be determined by the Court at a subsequent
    stage of these proceedings;
    (v) provide adequate guarantees that it will refrain in future from preventing the
    Statute of the River Uruguay of 1975 from being applied, in particular the
    consultation procedure established by Chapter II of that Treaty.”
    - 17 -
    On behalf of the Government of Uruguay,
    at the hearing of 2 October 2009:
    “On the basis of the facts and arguments set out in Uruguay’s
    Counter-Memorial, Rejoinder and during the oral proceedings, Uruguay requests that
    the Court adjudge and declare that the claims of Argentina are rejected, and Uruguay’s
    right to continue operating the Botnia plant in conformity with the provisions of the
    1975 Statute is affirmed.”
    *
    * *
    I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND FACTS OF THE CASE
    25. The dispute before the Court has arisen in connection with the planned construction
    authorized by Uruguay of one pulp mill and the construction and commissioning of another, also
    authorized by Uruguay, on the River Uruguay (see sketch-map No. 1 for the general geographical
    context). After identifying the legal instruments concerning the River Uruguay by which the
    Parties are bound, the Court will set out the main facts of the case.
    A. Legal framework
    26. The boundary between Argentina and Uruguay in the River Uruguay is defined by the
    bilateral Treaty entered into for that purpose at Montevideo on 7 April 1961 (UNTS, Vol. 635,
    No. 9074, p. 98). Articles 1 to 4 of the Treaty delimit the boundary between the Contracting States
    in the river and attribute certain islands and islets in it to them. Articles 5 and 6 concern the régime
    for navigation on the river. Article 7 provides for the establishment by the parties of a “régime for
    the use of the river” covering various subjects, including the conservation of living resources and
    the prevention of water pollution of the river. Articles 8 to 10 lay down certain obligations
    concerning the islands and islets and their inhabitants.
    27. The “régime for the use of the river” contemplated in Article 7 of the 1961 Treaty was
    established through the 1975 Statute (see paragraph 1 above). Article 1 of the 1975 Statute states
    that the parties adopted it “in order to establish the joint machinery necessary for the optimum and
    rational utilization of the River Uruguay, in strict observance of the rights and obligations arising
    from treaties and other international agreements in force for each of the parties”. After having thus
    defined its purpose (Article 1) and having also made clear the meaning of certain terms used
    therein (Article 2), the 1975 Statute lays down rules governing navigation and works on the river
    (Chapter II, Articles 3 to 13), pilotage (Chapter III, Articles 14 to 16), port facilities, unloading and
    additional loading (Chapter IV, Articles 17 to 18), the safeguarding of human life (Chapter V,
    Articles 19 to 23) and the salvaging of property (Chapter VI, Articles 24 to 26), use of the waters of
    the river (Chapter VII, Articles 27 to 29), resources of the bed and subsoil (Chapter VIII,
    Articles 30 to 34), the conservation, utilization and development of other natural resources
    ARGENTINA
    URUGUAY
    Sketch-map No. 1:
    Río de la Plata
    BUENOS AIRES
    General geographical context
    Mercator Projection
    (33° 30' S)
    WGS 84
    This sketch-map has been prepared
    for illustrative purposes only .
    River Uruguay
    RiverGualeguaychú
    MONTEVIDEO
    (location of Orion (Botnia) mill)
    Fray Bentos
    Gualeguaychú
    Nueva Palmira
    - 19 -
    (Chapter IX, Articles 35 to 39), pollution (Chapter X, Articles 40 to 43), scientific research
    (Chapter XI, Articles 44 to 45), and various powers of the parties over the river and vessels sailing
    on it (Chapter XII, Articles 46 to 48). The 1975 Statute sets up the Administrative Commission of
    the River Uruguay (hereinafter “CARU”, from the Spanish acronym for “Comisión Administradora
    del Río Uruguay”) (Chapter XIII, Articles 49 to 57), and then establishes procedures for
    conciliation (Chap. XIV, Articles 58 to 59) and judicial settlement of disputes (Chapter XV,
    Article 60). Lastly, the 1975 Statute contains transitional (Chapter XVI, Articles 61 to 62) and
    final (Chapter XVII, Article 63) provisions.
    B. CMB (ENCE) Project
    28. The first pulp mill at the root of the dispute was planned by “Celulosas de M’Bopicuá
    S.A.” (hereinafter “CMB”), a company formed by the Spanish company ENCE (from the Spanish
    acronym for “Empresa Nacional de Celulosas de España”, hereinafter “ENCE”). This mill,
    hereinafter referred to as the “CMB (ENCE)” mill, was to have been built on the left bank of the
    River Uruguay in the Uruguayan department of Río Negro opposite the Argentine region of
    Gualeguaychú, more specifically to the east of the city of Fray Bentos, near the “General San
    Martín” international bridge (see sketch-map No. 2).
    29. On 22 July 2002, the promoters of this industrial project approached the Uruguayan
    authorities and submitted an environmental impact assessment (“EIA” according to the
    abbreviation used by the Parties) of the plan to Uruguay’s National Directorate for the Environment
    (hereinafter “DINAMA”, from the Spanish acronym for “Dirección Nacional de Medio
    Ambiente”). During the same period, representatives of CMB, which had been specially formed to
    build the CMB (ENCE) mill, informed the President of CARU of the project. The President of
    CARU wrote to the Uruguayan Minister of the Environment on 17 October 2002 seeking a copy of
    the environmental impact assessment of the CMB (ENCE) project submitted by the promoters of
    this industrial project. This request was reiterated on 21 April 2003. On 14 May 2003, Uruguay
    submitted to CARU a document entitled “Environmental Impact Study, Celulosas de M’Bopicuá.
    Summary for public release”. One month later, the CARU Subcommittee on Water Quality and
    Pollution Control took notice of the document transmitted by Uruguay and suggested that a copy
    thereof be sent to its technical advisers for their opinions. Copies were also provided to the Parties’
    delegations.
    30. A public hearing, attended by CARU’s Legal Adviser and its technical secretary, was
    held on 21 July 2003 in the city of Fray Bentos concerning CMB’s application for an
    environmental authorization. On 15 August 2003, CARU asked Uruguay for further information
    on various points concerning the planned CMB (ENCE) mill. This request was reiterated on
    12 September 2003. On 2 October 2003, DINAMA submitted its assessment report to the
    Uruguayan Ministry of Housing, Land Use Planning and Environmental Affairs (hereinafter
    “MVOTMA”, from the Spanish abbreviation for “Ministerio de Vivienda Ordenamiento Territorial
    y Medio Ambiente”), recommending that CMB be granted an initial environmental authorization
    (“AAP” according to the Spanish abbreviation for “autorización ambiental previa”) subject to
    certain conditions. On 8 October 2003, CARU was informed by the Uruguayan delegation that
    DINAMA would very shortly send CARU a report on the CMB (ENCE) project.
    the planned CMB (ENCE) mill (not built)
    CMB (ENCE) mill (planned but not built)
    River Gualeguaychú
    ARGENTINA
    Inés Lagoon
    Gualeguaychú
    General San
    URUGUAY
    for illustrative purposes only .
    This sketch-map has been prepared
    WGS84
    (33° S)
    Mercator Projection
    River Uruguay
    Sketch-map No. 2:
    Siting of the Orion (Botnia) mill and
    Martín bridge
    Ñandubaysal Bay
    Orion (Botnia) mill
    Fray Bentos
    - 21 -
    31. On 9 October 2003, MVOTMA issued an initial environmental authorization to CMB for
    the construction of the CMB (ENCE) mill. On the same date the Presidents of Argentina and
    Uruguay met at Anchorena (Colonia, Uruguay). Argentina maintains that the President of
    Uruguay, Jorge Battle, then promised his Argentine counterpart, Néstor Kirchner, that no
    authorization would be issued before Argentina’s environmental concerns had been addressed.
    Uruguay challenges this version of the facts and contends that the Parties agreed at that meeting to
    deal with the CMB (ENCE) project otherwise than through the procedure under Articles 7 to 12 of
    the 1975 Statute and that Argentina let it be known that it was not opposed to the project per se.
    Argentina disputes these assertions.
    32. The day after the meeting between the Heads of State of Argentina and Uruguay, CARU
    declared its willingness to resume the technical analyses of the CMB (ENCE) project as soon as
    Uruguay transmitted the awaited documents. On 17 October 2003, CARU held an extraordinary
    plenary meeting at the request of Argentina, at which Argentina complained of Uruguay’s granting
    on 9 October 2003 of the initial environmental authorization. Following the extraordinary meeting
    CARU suspended work for more than six months, as the Parties could not agree on how to
    implement the consultation mechanism established by the 1975 Statute.
    33. On 27 October 2003, Uruguay transmitted to Argentina copies of the environmental
    impact assessment submitted by ENCE on 22 July 2002, of DINAMA’s final assessment report
    dated 2 October 2003 and of the initial environmental authorization of 9 October 2003. Argentina
    reacted by expressing its view that Article 7 of the 1975 Statute had not been observed and that the
    transmitted documents did not appear adequate to allow for a technical opinion to be expressed on
    the environmental impact of the project. On 7 November 2003, further to a request from the
    Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Argentina, Uruguay provided Argentina with a copy of the
    Uruguayan Ministry of the Environment’s entire file on the CMB (ENCE) project. On
    23 February 2004, Argentina forwarded all of this documentation received from Uruguay to
    CARU.
    34. On 2 March 2004, the Parties’ Ministers for Foreign Affairs met in Buenos Aires. On
    15 May 2004, CARU resumed its work at an extraordinary plenary meeting during which it took
    note of the ministerial “understanding” which was reached on 2 March 2004. The Parties are at
    odds over the content of this “understanding”. The Court will return to this when it considers
    Argentina’s claims as to Uruguay’s breach of its procedural obligations under the 1975 Statute (see
    paragraphs 67 to 158).
    35. Following up on CARU’s extraordinary meeting of 15 May 2004, the CARU
    Subcommittee on Water Quality and Pollution Control prepared a plan for monitoring water quality
    in the area of the pulp mills (hereinafter the “PROCEL” plan from the Spanish acronym for “Plan
    de Monitoreo de la Calidad Ambiental en el Río Uruguay en Áreas de Plantas Celulósicas”).
    CARU approved the plan on 12 November 2004.
    - 22 -
    36. On 28 November 2005, Uruguay authorized preparatory work to begin for the
    construction of the CMB (ENCE) mill (ground clearing). On 28 March 2006, the project’s
    promoters decided to halt the work for 90 days. On 21 September 2006, they announced their
    intention not to build the mill at the planned site on the bank of the River Uruguay.
    C. Orion (Botnia) mill
    37. The second industrial project at the root of the dispute before the Court was undertaken
    by “Botnia S.A.” and “Botnia Fray Bentos S.A.” (hereinafter “Botnia”), companies formed under
    Uruguayan law in 2003 specially for the purpose by Oy Metsä-Botnia AB, a Finnish company.
    This second pulp mill, called “Orion” (hereinafter the “Orion (Botnia)” mill), has been built on the
    left bank of the River Uruguay, a few kilometres downstream of the site planned for the CMB
    (ENCE) mill, and also near the city of Fray Bentos (see sketch-map No. 2). It has been operational
    and functioning since 9 November 2007.
    38. After informing the Uruguayan authorities of this industrial project in late 2003, the
    project promoters submitted an application to them for an initial environmental authorization on
    31 March 2004 and supplemented it on 7 April 2004. Several weeks later, on 29 and
    30 April 2004, CARU members and Botnia representatives met informally. Following that
    meeting, CARU’s Subcommittee on Water Quality and Pollution Control suggested on
    18 June 2004 that Botnia expand on the information provided at the meeting. On 19 October 2004,
    CARU held another meeting with Botnia representatives and again expressed the need for further
    information on Botnia’s application to DINAMA for an initial environmental authorization. On
    12 November 2004, when approving the water quality monitoring plan put forward by the CARU
    Subcommittee on Water Quality and Pollution Control (see paragraph 35 above), CARU decided,
    on the proposal of that subcommittee, to ask Uruguay to provide further information on the
    application for an initial environmental authorization. CARU transmitted this request for further
    information to Uruguay by note dated 16 November 2004.
    39. On 21 December 2004 DINAMA held a public hearing, attended by a CARU adviser, on
    the Orion (Botnia) project in Fray Bentos. DINAMA adopted its environmental impact study of
    the planned Orion (Botnia) mill on 11 February 2005 and recommended that the initial
    environmental authorization be granted, subject to certain conditions. MVOTMA issued the initial
    authorization to Botnia on 14 February 2005 for the construction of the Orion (Botnia) mill and an
    adjacent port terminal. At a CARU meeting on 11 March 2005, Argentina questioned whether the
    granting of the initial environmental authorization was well-founded in view of the procedural
    obligations laid down in the 1975 Statute. Argentina reiterated this position at the CARU meeting
    on 6 May 2005. On 12 April 2005, Uruguay had in the meantime authorized the clearance of the
    future mill site and the associated groundworks.
    - 23 -
    40. On 31 May 2005, in pursuance of an agreement made on 5 May 2005 by the Presidents
    of the two Parties, their Ministers for Foreign Affairs created a High-Level Technical Group
    (hereinafter the “GTAN”, from the Spanish abbreviation for “Grupo Técnico de Alto Nivel”),
    which was given responsibility for resolving the disputes over the CMB (ENCE) and Orion
    (Botnia) mills within 180 days. The GTAN held 12 meetings between 3 August 2005 and
    30 January 2006, with the Parties exchanging various documents in the context of this bilateral
    process. On 31 January 2006, Uruguay determined that the negotiations undertaken within the
    GTAN had failed; Argentina did likewise on 3 February 2006. The Court will return later to the
    significance of this process agreed on by the Parties (see paragraphs 132 to 149).
    41. On 26 June 2005, Argentina wrote to the President of the International Bank for
    Reconstruction and Development to express its concern at the possibility of the International
    Finance Corporation (hereinafter the “IFC”) contributing to the financing of the planned pulp mills.
    The IFC nevertheless decided to provide financial support for the Orion (Botnia) mill, but did
    commission EcoMetrix, a consultancy specializing in environmental and industrial matters, to
    prepare various technical reports on the planned mill and an environmental impact assessment of it.
    EcoMetrix was also engaged by the IFC to carry out environmental monitoring on the IFC’s behalf
    of the plant once it had been placed in service.
    42. On 5 July 2005, Uruguay authorized Botnia to build a port adjacent to the Orion (Botnia)
    mill. This authorization was transmitted to CARU on 15 August 2005. On 22 August 2005,
    Uruguay authorized the construction of a chimney and concrete foundations for the Orion (Botnia)
    mill. Further authorizations were granted as the construction of this mill proceeded, for example in
    respect of the waste treatment installations. On 13 October 2005, Uruguay transmitted additional
    documentation to CARU concerning the port terminal adjacent to the Orion (Botnia) mill.
    Argentina repeatedly asked, including at CARU meetings, that the initial work connected
    with the Orion (Botnia) mill and the CMB (ENCE) mill should be suspended. At a meeting
    between the Heads of State of the Parties at Santiago de Chile on 11 March 2006, Uruguay’s
    President asked ENCE and Botnia to suspend construction of the mills. ENCE suspended work for
    90 days (see paragraph 36 above), Botnia for ten.
    43. Argentina referred the present dispute to the Court by Application dated 4 May 2006.
    On 24 August 2006, Uruguay authorized the commissioning of the port terminal adjacent to the
    Orion (Botnia) mill and gave CARU notice of this on 4 September 2006. On 12 September 2006,
    Uruguay authorized Botnia to extract and use water from the river for industrial purposes and
    formally notified CARU of its authorization on 17 October 2006. At the summit of Heads of State
    and Government of the Ibero-American countries held in Montevideo in November 2006, the King
    of Spain was asked to endeavour to reconcile the positions of the Parties; a negotiated resolution of
    the dispute did not however result. On 8 November 2007, Uruguay authorized the commissioning
    of the Orion (Botnia) mill and it began operating the next day. In December 2009, Oy
    Metsä-Botnia AB transferred its interest in the Orion (Botnia) mill to UPM, another Finnish
    company.
    *
    - 24 -
    44. In addition, Uruguay authorized Ontur International S.A. to build and operate a port
    terminal at Nueva Palmira. The terminal was inaugurated in August 2007 and, on
    16 November 2007, Uruguay transmitted to CARU a copy of the authorization for its
    commissioning.
    45. In their written pleadings the Parties have debated whether, in light of the procedural
    obligations laid down in the 1975 Statute, the authorizations for the port terminal were properly
    issued by Uruguay. The Court deems it unnecessary to review the detailed facts leading up to the
    construction of the Nueva Palmira terminal, being of the view that these port facilities do not fall
    within the scope of the subject of the dispute before it. Indeed, nowhere in the claims asserted in
    its Application or in the submissions in its Memorial or Reply (see paragraphs 22 and 23 above)
    did Argentina explicitly refer to the port terminal at Nueva Palmira. In its final submissions
    presented at the hearing on 29 September 2009, Argentina again limited the subject-matter of its
    claims to the authorization of the construction of the CMB (ENCE) mill and the authorization of
    the construction and commissioning of “the Botnia mill and its associated facilities on the left bank
    of the River Uruguay”. The Court does not consider the port terminal at Nueva Palmira, which lies
    some 100 km south of Fray Bentos, downstream of the Orion (Botnia) mill (see sketch-map No. 1),
    and is used by other economic operators as well, to be a facility “associated” with the mill.
    46. The dispute submitted to the Court concerns the interpretation and application of the
    1975 Statute, namely, on the one hand whether Uruguay complied with its procedural obligations
    under the 1975 Statute in issuing authorizations for the construction of the CMB (ENCE) mill as
    well as for the construction and the commissioning of the Orion (Botnia) mill and its adjacent port;
    and on the other hand whether Uruguay has complied with its substantive obligations under the
    1975 Statute since the commissioning of the Orion (Botnia) mill in November 2007.
    * *
    47. Having thus related the circumstances surrounding the dispute between the Parties, the
    Court will consider the basis and scope of its jurisdiction, including questions relating to the law
    applicable to the present dispute (see paragraphs 48 to 66). It will then examine Argentina’s
    allegations of breaches by Uruguay of procedural obligations (see paragraphs 67 to 158) and
    substantive obligations (see paragraphs 159 to 266) laid down in the 1975 Statute. Lastly, the
    Court will respond to the claims presented by the Parties in their final submissions (see
    paragraphs 267 to 280).
    * *
    - 25 -
    II. SCOPE OF THE COURT’S JURISDICTION
    48. The Parties are in agreement that the Court’s jurisdiction is based on Article 36,
    paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Court and Article 60, paragraph 1, of the 1975 Statute. The latter
    reads: “Any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaty1 and the Statute
    which cannot be settled by direct negotiations may be submitted by either party to the International
    Court of Justice.” The Parties differ as to whether all the claims advanced by Argentina fall within
    the ambit of the compromissory clause.
    49. Uruguay acknowledges that the Court’s jurisdiction under the compromissory clause
    extends to claims concerning any pollution or type of harm caused to the River Uruguay, or to
    organisms living there, in violation of the 1975 Statute. Uruguay also acknowledges that claims
    concerning the alleged impact of the operation of the pulp mill on the quality of the waters of the
    river fall within the compromissory clause. On the other hand, Uruguay takes the position that
    Argentina cannot rely on the compromissory clause to submit claims regarding every type of
    environmental damage. Uruguay further argues that Argentina’s contentions concerning air
    pollution, noise, visual and general nuisance, as well as the specific impact on the tourism sector,
    allegedly caused by the Orion (Botnia) mill, do not concern the interpretation or the application of
    the 1975 Statute, and the Court therefore lacks jurisdiction over them.
    Uruguay nevertheless does concede that air pollution which has harmful effects on the
    quality of the waters of the river or on the aquatic environment would fall within the jurisdiction of
    the Court.
    50. Argentina maintains that Uruguay’s position on the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction is
    too narrow. It contends that the 1975 Statute was entered into with a view to protect not only the
    quality of the waters of the river but more generally its “régime” and the areas affected by it.
    Relying on Article 36 of the 1975 Statute, which lays out the obligation of the parties to co-ordinate
    measures to avoid any change in the ecological balance and to control harmful factors in the river
    and the areas affected by it, Argentina asserts that the Court has jurisdiction also with respect to
    claims concerning air pollution and even noise and “visual” pollution. Moreover, Argentina
    contends that bad odours caused by the Orion (Botnia) mill negatively affect the use of the river for
    recreational purposes, particularly in the Gualeguaychú resort on its bank of the river. This claim,
    according to Argentina, also falls within the Court’s jurisdiction.
    51. The Court, when addressing various allegations or claims advanced by Argentina, will
    have to determine whether they concern “the interpretation or application” of the 1975 Statute, as
    its jurisdiction under Article 60 thereof covers “[a]ny dispute concerning the interpretation or
    application of the [1961] Treaty and the [1975] Statute”. Argentina has made no claim to the effect
    that Uruguay violated obligations under the 1961 Treaty.
    1The Montevideo Treaty of 7 April 1961, concerning the boundary constituted by the River Uruguay (UNTS,
    Vol. 635, No. 9074, p. 98; footnote added).
    - 26 -
    52. In order to determine whether Uruguay has breached its obligations under the
    1975 Statute, as alleged by Argentina, the Court will have to interpret its provisions and to
    determine their scope ratione materiae.
    Only those claims advanced by Argentina which are based on the provisions of the
    1975 Statute fall within the Court’s jurisdiction ratione materiae under the compromissory clause
    contained in Article 60. Although Argentina, when making claims concerning noise and “visual”
    pollution allegedly caused by the pulp mill, invokes the provision of Article 36 of the 1975 Statute,
    the Court sees no basis in it for such claims. The plain language of Article 36, which provides that
    “[t]he parties shall co-ordinate, through the Commission, the necessary measures to avoid any
    change in the ecological balance and to control pests and other harmful factors in the river and the
    areas affected by it”, leaves no doubt that it does not address the alleged noise and visual pollution
    as claimed by Argentina. Nor does the Court see any other basis in the 1975 Statute for such
    claims; therefore, the claims relating to noise and visual pollution are manifestly outside the
    jurisdiction of the Court conferred upon it under Article 60.
    Similarly, no provision of the 1975 Statute addresses the issue of “bad odours” complained
    of by Argentina. Consequently, for the same reason, the claim regarding the impact of bad odours
    on tourism in Argentina also falls outside the Court’s jurisdiction. Even if bad odours were to be
    subsumed under the issue of air pollution, which will be addressed in paragraphs 263 and 264
    below, the Court notes that Argentina has submitted no evidence as to any relationship between the
    alleged bad odours and the aquatic environment of the river.
    53. Characterizing the provisions of Articles 1 and 41 of the 1975 Statute as “referral
    clauses”, Argentina ascribes to them the effect of incorporating into the Statute the obligations of
    the Parties under general international law and a number of multilateral conventions pertaining to
    the protection of the environment. Consequently, in the view of Argentina, the Court has
    jurisdiction to determine whether Uruguay has complied with its obligations under certain
    international conventions.
    54. The Court now therefore turns its attention to the issue whether its jurisdiction under
    Article 60 of the 1975 Statute also encompasses obligations of the Parties under international
    agreements and general international law invoked by Argentina and to the role of such agreements
    and general international law in the context of the present case.
    55. Argentina asserts that the 1975 Statute constitutes the law applicable to the dispute
    before the Court, as supplemented so far as its application and interpretation are concerned, by
    various customary principles and treaties in force between the Parties and referred to in the Statute.
    Relying on the rule of treaty interpretation set out in Article 31, paragraph 3 (c) of the Vienna
    Convention on the Law of Treaties, Argentina contends notably that the 1975 Statute must be
    interpreted in the light of principles governing the law of international watercourses and principles
    of international law ensuring protection of the environment. It asserts that the 1975 Statute must be
    interpreted so as to take account of all “relevant rules” of international law applicable in the
    relations between the Parties, so that the Statute’s interpretation remains current and evolves in
    accordance with changes in environmental standards. In this connection Argentina refers to the
    - 27 -
    principles of equitable, reasonable and non-injurious use of international watercourses, the
    principles of sustainable development, prevention, precaution and the need to carry out an
    environmental impact assessment. It contends that these rules and principles are applicable in
    giving the 1975 Statute a dynamic interpretation, although they neither replace it nor restrict its
    scope.
    56. Argentina further considers that the Court must require compliance with the Parties’
    treaty obligations referred to in Articles 1 and 41 (a) of the 1975 Statute. Argentina maintains that
    the “referral clauses” contained in these articles make it possible to incorporate and apply
    obligations arising from other treaties and international agreements binding on the Parties. To this
    end, Argentina refers to the 1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of
    Wild Fauna and Flora (hereinafter the “CITES Convention”), the 1971 Ramsar Convention on
    Wetlands of International Importance (hereinafter the “Ramsar Convention”), the 1992 United
    Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (hereinafter the “Biodiversity Convention”), and the
    2001 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (hereinafter the “POPs Convention”).
    It asserts that these conventional obligations are in addition to the obligations arising under the
    1975 Statute, and observance of them should be ensured when application of the Statute is being
    considered. Argentina maintains that it is only where “more specific rules of the [1975] Statute
    (lex specialis)” derogate from them that the instruments to which the Statute refers should not be
    applied.
    57. Uruguay likewise considers that the 1975 Statute must be interpreted in the light of
    general international law and it observes that the Parties concur on this point. It maintains however
    that its interpretation of the 1975 Statute accords with the various general principles of the law of
    international watercourses and of international environmental law, even if its understanding of
    these principles does not entirely correspond to that of Argentina. Uruguay considers that whether
    Articles 1 and 41 (a) of the 1975 Statute can be read as a referral to other treaties in force between
    the Parties has no bearing in the present case, because conventions relied on by Argentina are either
    irrelevant, or Uruguay cannot be found to have violated any other conventional obligations. In any
    event, the Court would lack jurisdiction to rule on alleged breaches of international obligations
    which are not contained in the 1975 Statute.
    58. The Court will first address the issue whether Articles 1 and 41 (a) can be read as
    incorporating into the 1975 Statute the obligations of the Parties under the various multilateral
    conventions relied upon by Argentina.
    59. Article 1 of the 1975 Statute reads as follows:
    “The parties agree on this Statute, in implementation of the provisions of
    Article 7 of the Treaty concerning the Boundary Constituted by the River Uruguay of
    7 April 1961, in order to establish the joint machinery necessary for the optimum and
    rational utilization of the River Uruguay, in strict observance of the rights and
    obligations arising from treaties and other international agreements in force for each of
    the parties.” (UNTS, Vol. 1295, No. I-21425, p. 340; footnote omitted.)
    - 28 -
    Article 1 sets out the purpose of the 1975 Statute. The Parties concluded it in order to
    establish the joint machinery necessary for the rational and optimum utilization of the River
    Uruguay. It is true that this article contains a reference to “the rights and obligations arising from
    treaties and other international agreements in force for each of the parties”. This reference,
    however, does not suggest that the Parties sought to make compliance with their obligations under
    other treaties one of their duties under the 1975 Statute; rather, the reference to other treaties
    emphasizes that the agreement of the Parties on the Statute is reached in implementation of the
    provisions of Article 7 of the 1961 Treaty and “in strict observance of the rights and obligations
    arising from treaties and other international agreements in force for each of the parties” (emphasis
    added). While the conjunction “and” is missing from the English and French translations of the
    1975 Statute, as published in the United Nations Treaty Series (Vol. 1295, p. 340 and p. 348), it is
    contained in the Spanish text of the Statute, which is the authentic text and reads as follows:
    “Las partes acuerdan el presente Estatuto, en cumplimiento de lo dispuesto en el
    Artículo 7 del Tratado de Límites en el Río Uruguay, de 7 de Abril de 1961 con el fin
    de establecer los mecanismos comunes necesarios para el óptimo y racional
    aprovechamiento del Río Uruguay, y en estricta observancia de los derechos y
    obligaciones emergentes de los tratados y demás compromisos internacionales
    vigentes para cualquiera de las partes.” (UNTS, Vol. 1295, p. 332; emphasis added.)
    The presence of the conjunction in the Spanish text suggests that the clause “in strict
    observance of the rights and obligations arising from treaties and other international agreements in
    force for each of the parties” is linked to and is to be read with the first part of Article 1, i.e., “[t]he
    parties agree on this Statute, in implementation of the provisions of Article 7 of the Treaty
    concerning the Boundary Constituted by the River Uruguay”.
    60. There is one additional element in the language of Article 1 of the 1975 Statute which
    should be noted. It mentions “treaties and other international agreements in force for each of the
    parties” (in Spanish original “tratados y demás compromisos internacionales vigentes para
    cualquiera de las partes”; emphasis added). In the French translation, this part of Article 1 reads
    “traités et autres engagements internationaux en vigueur à l’égard de l’une ou l’autre des parties”
    (emphasis added).
    The fact that Article 1 does not require that the “treaties and other international agreements”
    should be in force between the two parties thus clearly indicates that the 1975 Statute takes account
    of the prior commitments of each of the parties which have a bearing on it.
    61. Article 41 of the 1975 Statute, paragraph (a) of which Argentina considers as
    constituting another “referral clause” incorporating the obligations under international agreements
    into the Statute, reads as follows:
    “Without prejudice to the functions assigned to the Commission in this respect,
    the parties undertake:
    (a) to protect and preserve the aquatic environment and, in particular, to prevent its
    pollution, by prescribing appropriate rules and [adopting appropriate] measures
    in accordance with applicable international agreements and in keeping, where
    relevant, with the guidelines and recommendations of international technical
    bodies;
    - 29 -
    (b) not to reduce in their respective legal systems:
    1. the technical requirements in force for preventing water pollution, and
    2. the severity of the penalties established for violations;
    (c) to inform one another of any rules which they plan to prescribe with regard to
    water pollution in order to establish equivalent rules in their respective legal
    systems.” (Emphasis added.)
    62. The Court observes that the words “adopting appropriate” do not appear in the English
    translation while they appear in the original Spanish text (“dictando las normas y adoptando las
    medidas apropiadas”). Basing itself on the original Spanish text, it is difficult for the Court to see
    how this provision could be construed as a “referral clause” having the effect of incorporating the
    obligations of the parties under international agreements and other norms envisaged within the
    ambit of the 1975 Statute.
    The purpose of the provision in Article 41 (a) is to protect and preserve the aquatic
    environment by requiring each of the parties to enact rules and to adopt appropriate measures.
    Article 41 (a) distinguishes between applicable international agreements and the guidelines and
    recommendations of international technical bodies. While the former are legally binding and
    therefore the domestic rules and regulations enacted and the measures adopted by the State have to
    comply with them, the latter, not being formally binding, are, to the extent they are relevant, to be
    taken into account by the State so that the domestic rules and regulations and the measures it adopts
    are compatible (“con adecuación”) with those guidelines and recommendations. However,
    Article 41 does not incorporate international agreements as such into the 1975 Statute but rather
    sets obligations for the parties to exercise their regulatory powers, in conformity with applicable
    international agreements, for the protection and preservation of the aquatic environment of the
    River Uruguay. Under Article 41 (b) the existing requirements for preventing water pollution and
    the severity of the penalties are not to be reduced. Finally, paragraph (c) of Article 41 concerns the
    obligation to inform the other party of plans to prescribe rules on water pollution.
    63. The Court concludes that there is no basis in the text of Article 41 of the 1975 Statute for
    the contention that it constitutes a “referral clause”. Consequently, the various multilateral
    conventions relied on by Argentina are not, as such, incorporated in the 1975 Statute. For that
    reason, they do not fall within the scope of the compromissory clause and therefore the Court has
    no jurisdiction to rule whether Uruguay has complied with its obligations thereunder.
    64. The Court next briefly turns to the issue of how the 1975 Statute is to be interpreted. The
    Parties concur as to the 1975 Statute’s origin and historical context, although they differ as to the
    nature and general tenor of the Statute and the procedural and substantive obligations therein.
    The Parties nevertheless are in agreement that the 1975 Statute is to be interpreted in
    accordance with rules of customary international law on treaty interpretation, as codified in
    Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
    - 30 -
    65. The Court has had recourse to these rules when it has had to interpret the provisions of
    treaties and international agreements concluded before the entry into force of the Vienna
    Convention on the Law of Treaties in 1980 (see, e.g., Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab
    Jamahiriya/Chad), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1994, p. 21, para. 41; Kasikili/Sedudu Island
    (Botswana/Namibia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1999 (II), p. 1059, para. 18).
    The 1975 Statute is also a treaty which predates the entry into force of the Vienna
    Convention on the Law of Treaties. In interpreting the terms of the 1975 Statute, the Court will
    have recourse to the customary rules on treaty interpretation as reflected in Article 31 of the Vienna
    Convention. Accordingly the 1975 Statute is to be “interpreted in good faith in accordance with
    the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the [Statute] in their context and in light of its
    object and purpose”. That interpretation will also take into account, together with the context, “any
    relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties”.
    66. In the interpretation of the 1975 Statute, taking account of relevant rules of international
    law applicable in the relations between the Parties, whether these are rules of general international
    law or contained in multilateral conventions to which the two States are parties, nevertheless has no
    bearing on the scope of the jurisdiction conferred on the Court under Article 60 of the 1975 Statute,
    which remains confined to disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the Statute.
    * *
    III. THE ALLEGED BREACH OF PROCEDURAL OBLIGATIONS
    67. The Application filed by Argentina on 4 May 2006 concerns the alleged breach by
    Uruguay of both procedural and substantive obligations laid down in the 1975 Statute. The Court
    will start by considering the alleged breach of procedural obligations under Articles 7 to 12 of the
    1975 Statute, in relation to the (CMB) ENCE and Orion (Botnia) mill projects and the facilities
    associated with the latter, on the left bank of the River Uruguay near the city of Fray Bentos.
    68. Argentina takes the view that the procedural obligations were intrinsically linked to the
    substantive obligations laid down by the 1975 Statute, and that a breach of the former entailed a
    breach of the latter.
    With regard to the procedural obligations, these are said by Argentina to constitute an
    integrated and indivisible whole in which CARU, as an organization, plays an essential role.
    Consequently, according to Argentina, Uruguay could not invoke other procedural
    arrangements so as to derogate from the procedural obligations laid down by the 1975 Statute,
    except by mutual consent.
    - 31 -
    69. Argentina argues that, at the end of the procedural mechanism provided for by the
    1975 Statute, and in the absence of agreement between the Parties, the latter have no choice but to
    submit the matter to the Court under the terms of Articles 12 and 60 of the Statute, with Uruguay
    being unable to proceed with the construction of the planned mills until the Court has delivered its
    Judgment.
    70. Following the lines of the argument put forward by the Applicant, the Court will examine
    in turn the following four points: The links between the procedural obligations and the substantive
    obligations (A); the procedural obligations and their interrelation with each other (B); whether the
    Parties agreed to derogate from the procedural obligations set out in the 1975 Statute (C); and
    Uruguay’s obligations at the end of the negotiation period (D).
    A. The links between the procedural obligations
    and the substantive obligations
    71. Argentina maintains that the procedural provisions laid down in Articles 7 to 12 of the
    1975 Statute are aimed at ensuring “the optimum and rational utilization of the [r]iver” (Article 1),
    just as are the provisions concerning use of water, the conservation, utilization and development of
    other natural resources, pollution and research. The aim is also said to be to prevent the Parties
    from acting unilaterally and without regard for earlier or current uses of the river. According to
    Argentina, any disregarding of this machinery would therefore undermine the object and purpose of
    the 1975 Statute; indeed the “optimum and rational utilization of the [r]iver” would not be ensured,
    as this could only be achieved in accordance with the procedures laid down under the Statute.
    72. It follows, according to Argentina, that a breach of the procedural obligations
    automatically entails a breach of the substantive obligations, since the two categories of obligations
    are indivisible. Such a position is said to be supported by the Order of the Court of 13 July 2006,
    according to which the 1975 Statute created “a comprehensive régime”.
    73. Uruguay similarly takes the view that the procedural obligations are intended to facilitate
    the performance of the substantive obligations, the former being a means rather than an end. It too
    points out that Article 1 of the 1975 Statute defines its object and purpose.
    74. However, Uruguay rejects Argentina’s argument as artificial, since it appears to mix
    procedural and substantive questions with the aim of creating the belief that the breach of
    procedural obligations necessarily entails the breach of substantive ones. According to Uruguay, it
    is for the Court to determine the breach, in itself, of each of these categories of obligations, and to
    draw the necessary conclusions in each case in terms of responsibility and reparation.
    75. The Court notes that the object and purpose of the 1975 Statute, set forth in Article 1, is
    for the Parties to achieve “the optimum and rational utilization of the River Uruguay” by means of
    the “joint machinery” for co-operation, which consists of both CARU and the procedural
    provisions contained in Articles 7 to 12 of the Statute.
    - 32 -
    The Court has observed in this respect, in its Order of 13 July 2006, that such use should
    allow for sustainable development which takes account of “the need to safeguard the continued
    conservation of the river environment and the rights of economic development of the riparian
    States” (Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Provisional Measures, Order of
    13 July 2006, I.C.J. Reports 2006, p. 133, para. 80).
    76. In the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros case, the Court, after recalling that “[t]his need to reconcile
    economic development with protection of the environment is aptly expressed in the concept of
    sustainable development”, added that “[i]t is for the Parties themselves to find an agreed solution
    that takes account of the objectives of the Treaty” (Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project
    (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 78, paras. 140-141).
    77. The Court observes that it is by co-operating that the States concerned can jointly
    manage the risks of damage to the environment that might be created by the plans initiated by one
    or other of them, so as to prevent the damage in question, through the performance of both the
    procedural and the substantive obligations laid down by the 1975 Statute. However, whereas the
    substantive obligations are frequently worded in broad terms, the procedural obligations are
    narrower and more specific, so as to facilitate the implementation of the 1975 Statute through a
    process of continuous consultation between the parties concerned. The Court has described the
    régime put in place by the 1975 Statute as a “comprehensive and progressive régime” (Pulp Mills
    on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Provisional Measures, Order of 13 July 2006,
    I.C.J. Reports 2006, p. 133, para. 81), since the two categories of obligations mentioned above
    complement one another perfectly, enabling the parties to achieve the object of the Statute which
    they set themselves in Article 1.
    78. The Court notes that the 1975 Statute created CARU and established procedures in
    connection with that institution, so as to enable the parties to fulfil their substantive obligations.
    However, nowhere does the 1975 Statute indicate that a party may fulfil its substantive obligations
    by complying solely with its procedural obligations, nor that a breach of procedural obligations
    automatically entails the breach of substantive ones.
    Likewise, the fact that the parties have complied with their substantive obligations does not
    mean that they are deemed to have complied ipso facto with their procedural obligations, or are
    excused from doing so. Moreover, the link between these two categories of obligations can also be
    broken, in fact, when a party which has not complied with its procedural obligations subsequently
    abandons the implementation of its planned activity.
    79. The Court considers, as a result of the above, that there is indeed a functional link, in
    regard to prevention, between the two categories of obligations laid down by the 1975 Statute, but
    that link does not prevent the States parties from being required to answer for those obligations
    separately, according to their specific content, and to assume, if necessary, the responsibility
    resulting from the breach of them, according to the circumstances.
    B. The procedural obligations and their interrelation
    80. The 1975 Statute imposes on a party which is planning certain activities, set out in
    Article 7, first paragraph, procedural obligations whose content, interrelation and time-limits are
    specified as follows in Articles 7 to 12:
    - 33 -
    “Article 7
    If one party plans to construct new channels, substantially modify or alter
    existing ones or carry out any other works which are liable to affect navigation, the
    régime of the river or the quality of its waters, it shall notify the Commission, which
    shall determine on a preliminary basis and within a maximum period of 30 days
    whether the plan might cause significant damage to the other party.
    If the Commission finds this to be the case or if a decision cannot be reached in
    that regard, the party concerned shall notify the other party of the plan through the said
    Commission.
    Such notification shall describe the main aspects of the work and, where
    appropriate, how it is to be carried out and shall include any other technical data that
    will enable the notified party to assess the probable impact of such works on
    navigation, the régime of the river or the quality of its waters.
    Article 8
    The notified party shall have a period of 180 days in which to respond in
    connection with the plan, starting from the date on which its delegation to the
    Commission receives the notification.
    Should the documentation referred to in Article 7 be incomplete, the notified
    party shall have 30 days in which to so inform, through the Commission, the party
    which plans to carry out the work.
    The period of 180 days mentioned above shall begin on the date on which the
    delegation of the notified party receives the full documentation.
    This period may be extended at the discretion of the Commission if the
    complexity of the plan so requires.
    Article 9
    If the notified party raises no objections or does not respond within the period
    established in Article 8, the other party may carry out or authorize the work planned.
    Article 10
    The notified party shall have the right to inspect the works being carried out in
    order to determine whether they conform to the plan submitted.
    Article 11
    Should the notified party come to the conclusion that the execution of the work
    or the programme of operations might significantly impair navigation, the régime of
    the river or the quality of its waters, it shall so notify the other party, through the
    Commission, within the period of 180 days established in Article 8.
    Such notification shall specify which aspects of the work or the programme of
    operations might significantly impair navigation, the régime of the river or the quality
    of its waters, the technical reasons on which this conclusion is based and the changes
    suggested to the plan or programme of operations.
    - 34 -
    Article 12
    Should the parties fail to reach agreement within 180 days following the
    notification referred to in Article 11, the procedure indicated in Chapter XV shall be
    followed.”
    81. The original Spanish text of Article 7 of the 1975 Statute reads as follows:
    “La parte que proyecte la construcción de nuevos canales, la modificación o
    alteración significativa de los ya existentes o la realización de cualesquiera otras obras
    de entidad suficiente para afectar la navegación, el régimen del Río o la calidad de sus
    aguas, deberá comunicarlo a la Comisión, la cual determinará sumariamente, y en un
    plazo máximo de treinta días, si el proyecto puede producir perjuicio sensible a la otra
    parte.
    Si así se resolviere o no se llegare a una decisión al respecto, la parte interesada
    deberá notificar el proyecto a la otra parte a través de la misma Comisión.
    En la notificación deberán figurar los aspectos esenciales de la obra y, si fuere
    el caso, el modo de su operación y los demás datos técnicos que permitan a la parte
    notificada hacer una evaluación del efecto probable que la obra ocasionará a la
    navegación, al régimen del Río o a la calidad de sus aguas.”
    The Court notes that, just as the original Spanish text, the French translation of this article
    (see paragraph 80 above) distinguishes between the obligation to inform (“comunicar”) CARU of
    any plan falling within its purview (first paragraph) and the obligation to notify (“notificar”) the
    other party (second paragraph). By contrast, the English translation uses the same verb “notify” in
    respect of both obligations. In order to conform to the original Spanish text, the Court will use in
    both linguistic versions of this Judgment the verb “inform” for the obligation set out in the first
    paragraph of Article 7 and the verb “notify” for the obligation set out in the second and third
    paragraphs.
    The Court considers that the procedural obligations of informing, notifying and negotiating
    constitute an appropriate means, accepted by the Parties, of achieving the objective which they set
    themselves in Article 1 of the 1975 Statute. These obligations are all the more vital when a shared
    resource is at issue, as in the case of the River Uruguay, which can only be protected through close
    and continuous co-operation between the riparian States.
    82. According to Argentina, by failing to comply with the initial obligation (Article 7, first
    paragraph, of the 1975 Statute) to refer the matter to CARU, Uruguay frustrated all the procedures
    laid down in Articles 7 to 12 of the Statute. In addition, by failing to notify Argentina of the plans
    for the CMB (ENCE) and Orion (Botnia) mills, through CARU, with all the necessary
    documentation, Uruguay is said not to have complied with Article 7, second and third paragraphs.
    Argentina adds that informal contacts which it or CARU may have had with the companies in
    question cannot serve as a substitute for Uruguay referring the matter to CARU and notifying
    Argentina of the projects through the Commission. Argentina concludes that Uruguay has
    breached all of its procedural obligations under the terms of Articles 7 to 12 of the 1975 Statute.
    - 35 -
    Uruguay, for its part, considers that referring the matter to CARU does not impose so great a
    constraint as Argentina contends and that the parties may agree, by mutual consent, to use different
    channels by employing other procedural arrangements in order to engage in co-operation. It
    concludes from this that it has not breached the procedural obligations laid down by the
    1975 Statute, even if it has performed them without following to the letter the formal process set
    out therein.
    83. The Court will first examine the nature and role of CARU, and then consider whether
    Uruguay has complied with its obligations to inform CARU and to notify Argentina of its plans.
    1. The nature and role of CARU
    84. Uruguay takes the view that CARU, like other river commissions, is not a body with
    autonomous powers, but rather a mechanism established to facilitate co-operation between the
    Parties. It adds that the States which have created these river commissions are free to go outside
    the joint mechanism when it suits their purposes, and that they often do so. According to Uruguay,
    since CARU is not empowered to act outside the will of the Parties, the latter are free to do directly
    what they have decided to do through the Commission, and in particular may agree not to inform it
    in the manner provided for in Article 7 of the 1975 Statute. Uruguay maintains that that is
    precisely what happened in the present case: the two States agreed to dispense with the preliminary
    review by CARU and to proceed immediately to direct negotiations.
    85. For Argentina, on the other hand, the 1975 Statute is not merely a bilateral treaty
    imposing reciprocal obligations on the parties; it establishes an institutional framework for close
    and ongoing co-operation, the core and essence of which is CARU. For Argentina, CARU is the
    key body for co-ordination between the parties in virtually all areas covered by the 1975 Statute.
    By failing to fulfil its obligations in this respect, Uruguay is said to be calling the 1975 Statute
    fundamentally into question.
    86. The Court recalls that it has already described CARU as
    “a joint mechanism with regulatory, executive, administrative, technical and
    conciliatory functions, entrusted with the proper implementation of the rules contained
    in the 1975 Statute governing the management of the shared river resource; . . . [a]
    mechanism [which] constitutes a very important part of that treaty régime” (Pulp Mills
    on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Provisional Measures, Order of
    13 July 2006, I.C.J. Reports 2006, pp. 133-134, para. 81).
    87. The Court notes, first, that CARU, in accordance with Article 50 of the 1975 Statute, was
    endowed with legal personality “in order to perform its functions” and that the parties to the
    1975 Statute undertook to provide it with “the necessary resources and all the information and
    facilities essential to its operations”. Consequently, far from being merely a transmission
    mechanism between the parties, CARU has a permanent existence of its own; it exercises rights
    and also bears duties in carrying out the functions attributed to it by the 1975 Statute.
    - 36 -
    88. While the decisions of the Commission must be adopted by common accord between the
    riparian States (Article 55), these are prepared and implemented by a secretariat whose staff enjoy
    privileges and immunities. Moreover, CARU is able to decentralize its various functions by setting
    up whatever subsidiary bodies it deems necessary (Article 52).
    89. The Court observes that, like any international organization with legal personality,
    CARU is entitled to exercise the powers assigned to it by the 1975 Statute and which are necessary
    to achieve the object and purpose of the latter, namely, “the optimum and rational utilization of the
    River Uruguay” (Article 1). As the Court has pointed out, “[i]nternational organizations are
    governed by the ‘principle of speciality’, that is to say, they are invested by the States which create
    them with powers, the limits of which are a function of the common interests whose promotion
    those States entrust to them” (Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict,
    Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), p. 78, para. 25). This also applies of course to
    organizations, which like CARU, only have two member States.
    90. Since CARU serves as a framework for consultation between the parties, particularly in
    the case of the planned works contemplated in Article 7, first paragraph, of the 1975 Statute,
    neither of them may depart from that framework unilaterally, as they see fit, and put other channels
    of communication in its place. By creating CARU and investing it with all the resources necessary
    for its operation, the parties have sought to provide the best possible guarantees of stability,
    continuity and effectiveness for their desire to co-operate in ensuring “the optimum and rational
    utilization of the River Uruguay”.
    91. That is why CARU plays a central role in the 1975 Statute and cannot be reduced to
    merely an optional mechanism available to the parties which each may use or not, as it pleases.
    CARU operates at all levels of utilization of the river, whether concerning the prevention of
    transboundary harm that may result from planned activities; the use of water, on which it receives
    reports from the parties and verifies whether the developments taken together are liable to cause
    significant damage (Articles 27 and 28); the avoidance of any change in the ecological balance
    (Article 36); scientific studies and research carried out by one party within the jurisdiction of the
    other (Article 44); the exercise of the right of law enforcement (Article 46); or the right of
    navigation (Article 48).
    92. Furthermore, CARU has been given the function of drawing up rules in many areas
    associated with the joint management of the river and listed in Article 56 of the 1975 Statute.
    Lastly, at the proposal of either party, the Commission can act as a conciliation body in any dispute
    which may arise between the parties (Article 58).
    93. Consequently, the Court considers that, because of the scale and diversity of the
    functions they have assigned to CARU, the Parties intended to make that international organization
    a central component in the fulfilment of their obligations to co-operate as laid down by the
    1975 Statute.
    2. Uruguay’s obligation to inform CARU
    94. The Court notes that the obligation of the State initiating the planned activity to inform
    CARU constitutes the first stage in the procedural mechanism as a whole which allows the two
    parties to achieve the object of the 1975 Statute, namely, the optimum and rational utilization of
    - 37 -
    the River Uruguay”. This stage, provided for in Article 7, first paragraph, involves the State which
    is initiating the planned activity informing CARU thereof, so that the latter can determine “on a
    preliminary basis” and within a maximum period of 30 days whether the plan might cause
    significant damage to the other party.
    95. To enable the remainder of the procedure to take its course, the parties have included
    alternative conditions in the 1975 Statute: either that the activity planned by one party should be
    liable, in CARU’s opinion, to cause significant damage to the other, creating an obligation of
    prevention for the first party to eliminate or minimize the risk, in consultation with the other party;
    or that CARU, having been duly informed, should not have reached a decision in that regard within
    the prescribed period.
    96. The Court notes that the Parties are agreed in considering that the two planned mills were
    works of sufficient importance to fall within the scope of Article 7 of the 1975 Statute, and thus for
    CARU to have been informed of them. The same applies to the plan to construct a port terminal at
    Fray Bentos for the exclusive use of the Orion (Botnia) mill, which included dredging work and
    use of the river bed.
    97. However, the Court observes that the Parties disagree on whether there is an obligation to
    inform CARU in respect of the extraction and use of water from the river for industrial purposes by
    the Orion (Botnia) mill. Argentina takes the view that the authorization granted by the Uruguayan
    Ministry of Transport and Public Works on 12 September 2006 concerns an activity of sufficient
    importance (“entidad suficiente”) to affect the régime of the river or the quality of its waters and
    that, in this matter, Uruguay should have followed the procedure laid down in Articles 7 to 12 of
    the 1975 Statute. For its part, Uruguay maintains that this activity forms an integral part of the
    Orion (Botnia) mill project as a whole, and that the 1975 Statute does not require CARU to be
    informed of each step in furtherance of the planned works.
    98. The Court points out that while the Parties are agreed in recognizing that CARU should
    have been informed of the two planned mills and the plan to construct the port terminal at Fray
    Bentos, they nonetheless differ as regards the content of the information which should be provided
    to CARU and as to when this should take place.
    99. Argentina has argued that the content of the obligation to inform must be determined in
    the light of its objective, which is to prevent threats to navigation, the régime of the river or the
    quality of the waters. According to Argentina, the plan which CARU must be informed of may be
    at a very early stage, since it is simply a matter of allowing the Commission to “determine on a
    preliminary basis”, within a very short period of 30 days, whether the plan “might cause significant
    damage to the other party”. It is only in the following phase of the procedure that the substance of
    the obligation to inform is said to become more extensive. In Argentina’s view, however, CARU
    must be informed prior to the authorization or implementation of a project on the River Uruguay.
    100. Citing the terms of Article 7, first paragraph, of the 1975 Statute, Uruguay gives a
    different interpretation of it, taking the view that the requirement to inform CARU specified by this
    provision cannot occur in the very early stages of planning, because there could not be sufficient
    information available to the Commission for it to determine whether or not the plan might cause
    - 38 -
    significant damage to the other State. For that, according to Uruguay, the project would have to
    have reached a stage where all the technical data on it are available. As the Court will consider
    further below, Uruguay seeks to link the content of the information to the time when it should be
    provided, which may even be after the State concerned has granted an initial environmental
    authorization.
    101. The Court points out that the principle of prevention, as a customary rule, has its origins
    in the due diligence that is required of a State in its territory. It is “every State’s obligation not to
    allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States” (Corfu
    Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 22). A State is
    thus obliged to use all the means at its disposal in order to avoid activities which take place in its
    territory, or in any area under its jurisdiction, causing significant damage to the environment of
    another State. This Court has established that this obligation “is now part of the corpus of
    international law relating to the environment” (Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,
    Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), p. 242, para. 29).
    102. In the view of the Court, the obligation to inform CARU allows for the initiation of
    co-operation between the Parties which is necessary in order to fulfil the obligation of prevention.
    This first procedural stage results in the 1975 Statute not being applied to activities which would
    appear to cause damage only to the State in whose territory they are carried out.
    103. The Court observes that with regard to the River Uruguay, which constitutes a shared
    resource, “significant damage to the other party” (Article 7, first paragraph, of the 1975 Statute)
    may result from impairment of navigation, the régime of the river or the quality of its waters.
    Moreover, Article 27 of the 1975 Statute stipulates that:
    “[t]he right of each party to use the waters of the river, within its jurisdiction, for
    domestic, sanitary, industrial and agricultural purposes shall be exercised without
    prejudice to the application of the procedure laid down in Articles 7 to 12 when the
    use is liable to affect the régime of the river or the quality of its waters”.
    104. The Court notes that, in accordance with the terms of Article 7, first paragraph, the
    information which must be provided to CARU, at this initial stage of the procedure, has to enable it
    to determine swiftly and on a preliminary basis whether the plan might cause significant damage to
    the other party. For CARU, at this stage, it is a question of deciding whether or not the plan falls
    under the co-operation procedure laid down by the 1975 Statute, and not of pronouncing on its
    actual impact on the river and the quality of its waters. This explains, in the opinion of the Court,
    the difference between the terminology of the first paragraph of Article 7, concerning the
    requirement to inform CARU, and that of the third paragraph, concerning the content of the
    notification to be addressed to the other party at a later stage, enabling it “to assess the probable
    impact of such works on navigation, the régime of the river or the quality of its waters”.
    105. The Court considers that the State planning activities referred to in Article 7 of the
    Statute is required to inform CARU as soon as it is in possession of a plan which is sufficiently
    developed to enable CARU to make the preliminary assessment (required by paragraph 1 of that
    - 39 -
    provision) of whether the proposed works might cause significant damage to the other party. At
    that stage, the information provided will not necessarily consist of a full assessment of the
    environmental impact of the project, which will often require further time and resources, although,
    where more complete information is available, this should, of course, be transmitted to CARU to
    give it the best possible basis on which to make its preliminary assessment. In any event, the duty
    to inform CARU will become applicable at the stage when the relevant authority has had the
    project referred to it with the aim of obtaining initial environmental authorization and before the
    granting of that authorization.
    106. The Court observes that, in the present case, Uruguay did not transmit to CARU the
    information required by Article 7, first paragraph, in respect of the CMB (ENCE) and Orion
    (Botnia) mills, despite the requests made to it by the Commission to that effect on several
    occasions, in particular on 17 October 2002 and 21 April 2003 with regard to the CMB (ENCE)
    mill, and on 16 November 2004 with regard to the Orion (Botnia) mill. Uruguay merely sent
    CARU, on 14 May 2003, a summary for public release of the environmental impact assessment for
    the CMB (ENCE) mill. CARU considered this document to be inadequate and again requested
    further information from Uruguay on 15 August 2003 and 12 September 2003. Moreover, Uruguay
    did not transmit any document to CARU regarding the Orion (Botnia) mill. Consequently, Uruguay
    issued the initial environmental authorizations to CMB on 9 October 2003 and to Botnia on
    14 February 2005 without complying with the procedure laid down in Article 7, first paragraph.
    Uruguay therefore came to a decision on the environmental impact of the projects without
    involving CARU, thereby simply giving effect to Article 17, third paragraph, of Uruguayan Decree
    No. 435/994 of 21 September 1994, Environmental Impact Assessment Regulation, according to
    which the Ministry of Housing, Land Use Planning and Environmental Affairs may grant the initial
    environmental authorization provided that the adverse environmental impacts of the project remain
    within acceptable limits.
    107. The Court further notes that on 12 April 2005 Uruguay granted an authorization to
    Botnia for the first phase of the construction of the Orion (Botnia) mill and, on 5 July 2005, an
    authorization to construct a port terminal for its exclusive use and to utilize the river bed for
    industrial purposes, without informing CARU of these projects in advance.
    108. With regard to the extraction and use of water from the river, of which CARU should
    have first been informed, according to Argentina, the Court takes the view that this is an activity
    which forms an integral part of the commissioning of the Orion (Botnia) mill and therefore did not
    require a separate referral to CARU.
    109. However, Uruguay maintains that CARU was made aware of the plans for the mills by
    representatives of ENCE on 8 July 2002, and no later than 29 April 2004 by representatives of
    Botnia, before the initial environmental authorizations were issued. Argentina, for its part,
    considers that these so-called private dealings, whatever form they may have taken, do not
    constitute performance of the obligation imposed on the Parties by Article 7, first paragraph.
    110. The Court considers that the information on the plans for the mills which reached
    CARU via the companies concerned or from other non-governmental sources cannot substitute for
    the obligation to inform laid down in Article 7, first paragraph, of the 1975 Statute, which is borne
    by the party planning to construct the works referred to in that provision. Similarly, in the case
    concerning Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v. France), the
    Court observed that
    - 40 -
    “[i]f the information eventually came to Djibouti through the press, the information
    disseminated in this way could not be taken into account for the purposes of the
    application of Article 17 [of the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters
    between the two countries, providing that ‘[r]easons shall be given for any refusal of
    mutual assistance’]” (Judgment of 4 June 2008, para. 150).
    111. Consequently, the Court concludes from the above that Uruguay, by not informing
    CARU of the planned works before the issuing of the initial environmental authorizations for each
    of the mills and for the port terminal adjacent to the Orion (Botnia) mill, has failed to comply with
    the obligation imposed on it by Article 7, first paragraph, of the 1975 Statute.
    3. Uruguay’s obligation to notify the plans to the other party
    112. The Court notes that, under the terms of Article 7, second paragraph, of the
    1975 Statute, if CARU decides that the plan might cause significant damage to the other party or if
    a decision cannot be reached in that regard, “the party concerned shall notify the other party of this
    plan through the said Commission”.
    Article 7, third paragraph, of the 1975 Statute sets out in detail the content of this
    notification, which
    “shall describe the main aspects of the work and . . . any other technical data that will
    enable the notified party to assess the probable impact of such works on navigation,
    the régime of the river or the quality of its waters”.
    113. In the opinion of the Court, the obligation to notify is intended to create the conditions
    for successful co-operation between the parties, enabling them to assess the plan’s impact on the
    river on the basis of the fullest possible information and, if necessary, to negotiate the adjustments
    needed to avoid the potential damage that it might cause.
    114. Article 8 stipulates a period of 180 days, which may be extended by the Commission,
    for the notified party to respond in connection with the plan, subject to it requesting the other party,
    through the Commission, to supplement as necessary the documentation it has provided.
    If the notified party raises no objections, the other party may carry out or authorize the work
    (Article 9). Otherwise, the former must notify the latter of those aspects of the work which may
    cause it damage and of the suggested changes (Article 11), thereby opening a further 180-day
    period of negotiation in which to reach an agreement (Article 12).
    115. The obligation to notify is therefore an essential part of the process leading the parties
    to consult in order to assess the risks of the plan and to negotiate possible changes which may
    eliminate those risks or minimize their effects.
    116. The Parties agree on the need for a full environmental impact assessment in order to
    assess any significant damage which might be caused by a plan.
    - 41 -
    117. Uruguay takes the view that such assessments were carried out in accordance with its
    legislation (Decree No. 435/994 of 21 September 1994, Environmental Impact Assessment
    Regulation), submitted to DINAMA for consideration and transmitted to Argentina on
    7 November 2003 in the case of the CMB (ENCE) project and on 19 August 2005 for the Orion
    (Botnia) project. According to Uruguay, DINAMA asked the companies concerned for all the
    additional information that was required to supplement the original environmental impact
    assessments submitted to it, and only when it was satisfied did it propose to the Ministry of the
    Environment that the initial environmental authorizations requested should be issued, which they
    were to CMB on 9 October 2003 and to Botnia on 14 February 2005.
    Uruguay maintains that it was not required to transmit the environmental impact assessments
    to Argentina before issuing the initial environmental authorizations to the companies, these
    authorizations having been adopted on the basis of its legislation on the subject.
    118. Argentina, for its part, first points out that the environmental impact assessments
    transmitted to it by Uruguay were incomplete, particularly in that they made no provision for
    alternative sites for the mills and failed to include any consultation of the affected populations. The
    Court will return later in the Judgment to the substantive conditions which must be met by
    environmental impact assessments (see paragraphs 203 to 219).
    Furthermore, in procedural terms, Argentina considers that the initial environmental
    authorizations should not have been granted to the companies before it had received the complete
    environmental impact assessments, and that it was unable to exercise its rights in this context under
    Articles 7 to 11 of the 1975 Statute.
    119. The Court notes that the environmental impact assessments which are necessary to
    reach a decision on any plan that is liable to cause significant transboundary harm to another State
    must be notified by the party concerned to the other party, through CARU, pursuant to Article 7,
    second and third paragraphs, of the 1975 Statute. This notification is intended to enable the
    notified party to participate in the process of ensuring that the assessment is complete, so that it can
    then consider the plan and its effects with a full knowledge of the facts (Article 8 of the
    1975 Statute).
    120. The Court observes that this notification must take place before the State concerned
    decides on the environmental viability of the plan, taking due account of the environmental impact
    assessment submitted to it.
    121. In the present case, the Court observes that the notification to Argentina of the
    environmental impact assessments for the CMB (ENCE) and Orion (Botnia) mills did not take
    place through CARU, and that Uruguay only transmitted those assessments to Argentina after
    having issued the initial environmental authorizations for the two mills in question. Thus in the
    case of CMB (ENCE), the matter was notified to Argentina on 27 October and 7 November 2003,
    whereas the initial environmental authorization had already been issued on 9 October 2003. In the
    case of Orion (Botnia), the file was transmitted to Argentina between August 2005 and
    January 2006, whereas the initial environmental authorization had been granted on
    14 February 2005. Uruguay ought not, prior to notification, to have issued the initial
    environmental authorizations and the authorizations for construction on the basis of the
    environmental impact assessments submitted to DINAMA. Indeed by doing so, Uruguay gave
    priority to its own legislation over its procedural obligations under the 1975 Statute and disregarded
    - 42 -
    the well-established customary rule reflected in Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
    Treaties, according to which “[a] party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as
    justification for its failure to perform a treaty”.
    122. The Court concludes from the above that Uruguay failed to comply with its obligation
    to notify the plans to Argentina through CARU under Article 7, second and third paragraphs, of the
    1975 Statute.
    C. Whether the Parties agreed to derogate from the procedural
    obligations set out in the 1975 Statute
    123. Having thus examined the procedural obligations laid down by the 1975 Statute, the
    Court now turns to the question of whether the Parties agreed, by mutual consent, to derogate from
    them, as alleged by Uruguay.
    Editado por última vez por Amon-Ra; http://www.escortsxp.com/foro/member/1-amon-ra en 25-04-10, 04:00:08.

  • Avatar de Invitado
    Invitado respondió
    Respuesta: Fallo de La Haya tema Botnia

    Originalmente publicado por Trapisonda Ver Mensaje
    Lo dicho, que poca calle, lechero, por favor no la sigas, ni vale la pena gopear los dedos sobre las teclas

    salu2

    hola kapo !!! que tal ? vos quien eras ????? :001_unsure: .... trabajas en la serenisima ?

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  • Avatar de Invitado
    Invitado respondió
    Respuesta: Fallo de La Haya tema Botnia

    Lo dicho, que poca calle, lechero, por favor no la sigas, ni vale la pena gopear los dedos sobre las teclas

    salu2

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  • Avatar de Invitado
    Invitado respondió
    Respuesta: Me Cago en Botnia justo ahora que subio la leche !!!

    Originalmente publicado por sssmmm Ver Mensaje
    no estoy de acuerdo con la pastera, por lo tanto no entendes mi postura, por lo tanto veo que ni lees mis mensajes, pero igual te sigo contestando
    1. LA CULPA DE LA CANCILLERIA ARGENTINA ME PARECE FUNDAMENTAL, DE HABERSE HECHO LAS COSAS DE OTRA MANERA NO SE HUBIERA INSTALADO LA PASTERA
    2. LA CULPA (TAMBIEN FUNDAMENTAL) ES DE URUGUAY, QUE INSTALO UNA PASTERA SIN TENER EN CUENTA ACUERDOS PREEXISTENTES CON ARGENTINA
    3. ENDILGARLE CULPAS A FINLANDIA, AL CAPITALISMO O A FORLAN ME PARECE QUERER DESVIAR EL FOCO DE LA DISCUSION


    PD:4. AGUANTE LECHERO TOTAL
    Si te lei, pero en algunas expresiones pareces expresarte a favor. Disculpa si te "malentendi". igual no entiendo tu postura.

    1. Ahi no nos vamos a poner de acuerdo, pero igual coincido en que hay algo de culpa.
    2. Si, tambien tienen mucho que ver y son responsables.
    3. No puedo estar de acuerdo en eso, aunque te suene exagerado es el ejemplo de manosanta del perro que el vecino lo hace cagar en tu jardin (en este caso se podria decir que estas dejando la puerta siempre abierta para que pueda hacerlo)

    4. Ya fue, que siga por su ruta habitual del conocimiento y la sabiduria y si no jode más: AGUANTE A FULL !!!

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  • Avatar de Invitado
    Invitado respondió
    Respuesta: Me Cago en Botnia justo ahora que subio la leche !!!

    Originalmente publicado por FUJITIVO Ver Mensaje
    Ya que lo pedis te voy a hacer el favor.

    Te aporto informacion de utilidad que encontre sobre este tema, es del 2005.


    Cuando te informas un poco sobre lo que ya pasó en chile con las pasteras (hay bastante data sobre eso) y lo que pasa a nivel mundial con las pasteras (donde instalar una un pais de la comunidad Europea ya no es posible), te vas a dar cuenta que el tema es al menos delicado, y no hay que andar defendiendo estas cuestiones solo porque si.
    Llevamos el debate a un plano que ya trasciendo lo que hicieron bien o mal en este gobierno, asi que el tema de tener una postura ya no encuadra por ese lado, podes pensar seriamente sobre esto y estar de acuerdo con esta parte de mi postura, o seguir en la tuya creyendo que probablemente el agua que usan ahi sale mineralizada lista para envasar.
    ------------------------------------------------------
    no estoy de acuerdo con la pastera, por lo tanto no entendes mi postura, por lo tanto veo que ni lees mis mensajes, pero igual te sigo contestando
    1. LA CULPA DE LA CANCILLERIA ARGENTINA ME PARECE FUNDAMENTAL, DE HABERSE HECHO LAS COSAS DE OTRA MANERA NO SE HUBIERA INSTALADO LA PASTERA
    2. LA CULPA (TAMBIEN FUNDAMENTAL) ES DE URUGUAY, QUE INSTALO UNA PASTERA SIN TENER EN CUENTA ACUERDOS PREEXISTENTES CON ARGENTINA
    3. ENDILGARLE CULPAS A FINLANDIA, AL CAPITALISMO O A FORLAN ME PARECE QUERER DESVIAR EL FOCO DE LA DISCUSION


    PD:4. AGUANTE LECHERO TOTAL

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  • Leonino
    respondió
    Respuesta: Fallo de La Haya tema Botnia

    Originalmente publicado por manosanta Ver Mensaje
    Pará un cachito: el que se hizo el picante señalando a la "bandita de desvirtuadores" fue tu amigo. Yo no me meto con los problemas de ese tipo, me importan un choto los puteríos de peluquería. Y lo que a vos te resultó insultante fueron los epítetos "salame" y "pajarito"...en fin...

    Por lo del corte del puente de Gualeguaychú, estamos de acuerdo.
    AYAYAYAYYYAAAAAAAAAAAAYYYYYYYYYYY

    Siguen haciendo KKKilombos los defensores de DDHH??????

    Son Pateticos (para no decir Patoteros)

    Aguante Lechero Total

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  • manosanta
    respondió
    Respuesta: Fallo de La Haya tema Botnia

    Originalmente publicado por lalogonzalo Ver Mensaje
    Fue exactamente asi como dice lechero total. Le pregunté por msn si él sabía qué había ocurrido con el forista en cuestión, me respondió que si y me contó sobre su problema.
    Entonces, le dije: pobre, en el foro lo estan deschavando por todos lados, y le copié el link de este tema para que lo leyera él mismo.



    Lechero, mi amigo personal, no creo que sea ningun salame y mucho menos un conventillero. Ahora, lo que estás haciendo vos sietemáticamente (dirigirte a la gente que no opina como vos permanentemente en términos despectivos) no le hace para nada bien a la convivencia dentro de este foro.

    Con respecto al tema de Botnia, que es el verdadero tema de este post, yo creo que deberían levantar el corte. No ha dado el resultado que los asambleistas esperaban que diera, y me parece que es más perjudicial que beneficioso.

    Saludos.
    Pará un cachito: el que se hizo el picante señalando a la "bandita de desvirtuadores" fue tu amigo. Yo no me meto con los problemas de ese tipo, me importan un choto los puteríos de peluquería. Y lo que a vos te resultó insultante fueron los epítetos "salame" y "pajarito"...en fin...

    Por lo del corte del puente de Gualeguaychú, estamos de acuerdo.

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  • Avatar de Invitado
    Invitado respondió
    Respuesta: Piscui, A vos te parece que estoy desvirtuando ?

    Originalmente publicado por slave Ver Mensaje
    Debe ser porque por estos lugares pagar coima debe ser mas facil y mas barato

    Saludos
    Las cagadas las hacen de este lado del continente, no es una novedad.

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  • Avatar de Invitado
    Invitado respondió
    Respuesta: Me Cago en Botnia justo ahora que subio la leche !!!

    Originalmente publicado por sssmmm Ver Mensaje
    todo ok
    pero la culpa es de URUGUAY, QUE ELIGIO POER DOS PASTERAS
    que joraca tiene que ver finlandia
    hacenos un favor y desasnanos en que lugares del globo botnia tiene pasteras
    Ya que lo pedis te voy a hacer el favor.

    Te aporto informacion de utilidad que encontre sobre este tema, es del 2005.


    Cuando te informas un poco sobre lo que ya pasó en chile con las pasteras (hay bastante data sobre eso) y lo que pasa a nivel mundial con las pasteras (donde instalar una un pais de la comunidad Europea ya no es posible), te vas a dar cuenta que el tema es al menos delicado, y no hay que andar defendiendo estas cuestiones solo porque si.
    Llevamos el debate a un plano que ya trasciendo lo que hicieron bien o mal en este gobierno, asi que el tema de tener una postura ya no encuadra por ese lado, podes pensar seriamente sobre esto y estar de acuerdo con esta parte de mi postura, o seguir en la tuya creyendo que probablemente el agua que usan ahi sale mineralizada lista para envasar.
    ------------------------------------------------------

    Celulosas y escándalos que hay detrás del grupo Botnia y Celco.

    Un monstruo grande que pisa fuerte. El Grupo Botnia de Finlandia comienza la instalación de una inmensa fábrica de celulosa a 4 Km. de la ciudad de Fray Bentos. Producirá al año 1.000.000 de toneladas de celulosa, que exportará a Europa (50 a 55%). China (30 a 35%) y el resto a EE.UU. Tiene cinco plantas de celulosa en Finlandia y otras en otros países, uno de ellos Chile. Aproximadamente el 80% de su producción de celulosa se vende a fábricas de papel, propiedad del mismo grupo empresarial. Esta producción hará que Botnia consuma anualmente 3.500.000 metros cúbicos de madera. La planta modelo de celulosa Arauco, utilizando el mismo tipo de tecnología finlandesa que el grupo empresarial Botnia, acaba de ser suspendida por el gobierno chileno debido a su alto nivel de polución. Había comenzado a operar en febrero 2004. Con tecnología de punta, una inversión de mil millones de dólares, y sometida a un Sistema de Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental A pesar de todas estas garantías no pudo evitarse un derrame de sulfato que afectó a habitantes ubicados a 30 Km. de distancia, provocándoles dolores de cabeza, náuseas e irritación en los ojos. Pudo constatarse que vierte 900 litros de residuos (tóxicos) por segundo en el Río Cruces; sus olores nauseabundos llegan hasta la ciudad de Valdivia (a unos 50 Km. de distancia); y los animales domésticos que beben las aguas del río de los pozos cercanos, mueren. En el caso de Botnia, la misma empresa reconoce como inevitable el mal olor que se expandirá a muchos kilómetros a la redonda. Monocultivo de eucaliptos: ¿un nuevo modelo de producción agraria? En este momento conviene recordar que ya se está construyendo una planta de celulosa a 12 Km. de Fray Bentos y a 5 de Botnia. Pertenece a ENCE (Empresa Nacional de Celulosa de España), cuya inversión y producción de celulosa serán aproximadamente la mitad del volumen comprometido en el proyecto de Botnia. La empresa Ence posee ya en la ribera oeste del río Uruguay una propia terminal logística denominada M???Bopicuá. Esto quiere decir que los efectos ambientales de la planta celulosa Botnia se amplificarán con los efectos causados por la planta de ENCE. Aún en la suposición que las previsibles graves contaminaciones ambientales no se den, queda en pie que por el hecho mismo de que estas plantas de celulosa existan, se promueve y se agiganta el monocultivo de eucaliptus. Ya en 1995, cuando todavía no se hablaba de Botnia ni de Ence, la Red Uruguaya de ONGs Ambientalistas reafirmaban a la Dirección de Recursos Naturales del MGAP su crítica a la política de forestación. Pedían al Ministerio hiciera estudios serios sobre los siguientes impactos de la forestación sobre: a) el suelo, b) el régimen hidrológico, c) la flora nativa, d) la fauna nativa. Impactos que han sido comprobados en muchísimos países. ¿Negocio para quién? ¿Para Chile? Algunos piensan que ante una oferta de inversión de 1.100 millones de dólares hay que decir sí o sí, y cerrar los ojos. Pero equivocan sus números. De esos 1.100 millones solamente 200 millones se invertirán en Chile. Los otros millones van directamente a Finlandia y Suecia, por la compra de maquinarias y otros servicios. ¿Nuevos empleos? Según la misma empresa, una vez puesta en marcha la planta necesitará solamente 300 trabajadores Siendo una cifra dada por la empresa hay que tomarla como el número máximo de nuevos empleos. De los cuales, según la empresa, solo ocho podrán ser contratados con solo primaria completos. A los otros se les exigirá capacitación técnica. Muchos de ellos vendrán del exterior. Se enorgullecen diciendo que no más de ocho operarios monitoreando los paneles de control bastan para mantener en funcionamiento toda la planta. Por otra parte, se calcula que se van a perder unos 1.500 trabajos en la pesca, la apicultura, el turismo y otras actividades afectadas directamente por la contaminación acústica, del agua y del aire producida por la planta ¿Empleos mientras se construye la planta? Sí, pan para hoy hambre para mañana. ¿Negocio para aquellas empresas forestales que no son de Bosnia o de Celco? Para ellas poco o nada va cambiar. En vez de exportar los troncos de eucaliptus los venderán a las plantas, probablemente a un precio menor. ¿Negocio para los transportistas? Con o sin fábricas de celulosa los troncos tienen que ser transportados. ¿Negocio portuario? Ninguno, pues la terminal es de la empresa y en régimen de zona franca. El negocio es de punta a punta del Grupo Botnia. Compra tierra a menor precio y produce eucaliptus dos veces más rápidamente que en Finlandia, Además, los trabajadores forestales son los peores remunerados en el campo y sin medidas de seguridad y condiciones de vida razonables. Esta multimillonaria empresa por otra parte está exonerada de todos los impuestos y de las tarifas aduaneras para importar y exportar. En un reciente artículo publicado en un medio de prensa finlandés en Internet se señala que el director ejecutivo de Metsä. Botnia -empresa que tiene el 51% de las acciones del Grupo Botnia- confía en que la planta sea muy competitiva; en comparación con las fábricas de celulosa modernas de Finlandia, los costos de producción estimados serían alrededor de la mitad. Un escándalo a todo color. Algo produce escándalo cuando hiere gravemente el sentido común y las convicciones profundas de una población. ¿De que otra manera podemos nombrar el impacto que produce en los uruguayos cuando nos vamos enterando de este gran negocio de Botnia y de los males que traerá al país? No solamente los directos producidos por el funcionamiento de la planta sino también porque promueve el monocultivo del eucaliptus, la producción que menos manos de obra ocupa, la más chupadora de agua, secando napas y afluentes, de intenso uso de pesticidas y generadora de plagas varias. Todos sabemos además que el Norte rico está llevando todas sus industrias contaminantes al Sur. El mito de las inversiones extranjeras. Esta inversión de Botnia nos traerá más daños y prejuicios que beneficios, más desocupación que nuevos puestos de trabajo, empobrecimiento de la zona en lugar de desarrollo. Pero es negocio y negocio suculento solo para los inversores. Sin embargo el solo hecho de que el Grupo Botnia invierta algo en Chile (unos 200 millones de dólares) para que el mito diga: ¡es provechoso para el país! Los necesarios estudios del impacto ambiental. Todo el mundo sabe que las plantas de celulosa son contaminantes. Lo que no se sabe es el grado de contaminación que alcanzará una futura planta. Argentina, Brasil, Chile lo saben muy bien porque ya tienen plantas de celulosa. La reacción es tan fuerte de los entrerrianos contra las fábricas de celulosa se debe en gran parte por su propia experiencia argentina y no la quieren sufrir en su propia región... Estas fábricas contaminantes no se hacen más en Europa, las ofrecen gentilmente a nosotros. Como se sabe que son contaminantes los gobiernos piden a estas fábricas que hagan estudios sobre el impacto ambiental que tendrán sus fábricas para estar en mejores condiciones de monitorear y controlar esa contaminación. El inmenso daño que están haciendo al país. Hay que insistir no sólo en el tremendo daño que harán al país sino también en el daño que ya están causando antes de la instalación de las plantas. Según datos proporcionados por técnicos vinculados a BOTNIA para producir en un año 1.000.000 de toneladas de celulosa requiere 3.5 millones de metros cúbicos de madera de eucaliptus. Si a esta cifra sumamos los 1.7 millones de metros cúbicos para producir sus 500.000 toneladas de celulosa al año, tenemos que ambas plantas juntas consumirán al año 5.2 millones de metros cúbicos de madera. Si se asume que un monte de eucaliptus de una hectárea crece al año promedialmente 25 m3, ambas plantas consumirían al año el crecimiento de 210.000 hectáreas de eucaluptus. Pero como el corte del eucaliptus se hace promedialmente cada 8 años, necesitarían ambas plantas una forestación de 1.680.000 has. Más unas 500.000 has de plantaciones de eucaliptus y en la provincia argentina de Entre Ríos unas 150.000 has. Esto significa que si ambas plantas se instalaran sería necesario para alimentarlas casi triplicar el área forestada actual. Es decir, los proyectos de BOTNIA. Las mejores tierras nuestras abandonarán los cultivos de cereales y la ganadería intensiva para dejar lugar a los montes de eucaliptus. Habría que enumerar otros daños que acarrea el monocultivo de eucaliptus. Primeramente, causa un incremento enorme de desempleo rural. La forestación es la producción agraria que menos mano de obra ocupa. Cada nueva hectárea ganada por el eucaliptus a otros cultivos, deja como saldo nueva desocupación. En segundo lugar, empeoran las condiciones de trabajo de los trabajadores, ya que los trabajadores forestales son los que menos ganan y los que trabajan en peores condiciones. Hasta ahora las empresas forestales del grupo Botnia prohibían la sindicalización de sus trabajadores. Esperemos que está situación con las nuevas medidas laborales comience a cambiar. En tercer lugar, los eucaliptos consumen cantidades muy grandes de agua, superficiales y subterráneas, con consecuencia para los campos linderos. Además de otras pestes que surgen por el uso abusivo de pesticidas y herbicidas, y la multiplicación de cotorras y carpinchos. Finalmente, está el inmenso daño que se ocasiona a la red vial, por el tránsito de camiones con cargas de 40 o más toneladas y que se acrecentará año tras año. El costo de reparaciones constantes de caminos, rutas y puentes corre a cuenta de todos los uruguayos. Tampoco habría que desestimar los daños a la fauna y flora inherentes a la forestación cuando se convierte en monocultivo de eucaliptos. Dioxinas y furanos: mortíferos agentes de contaminación. De aquí en adelante los chilenos tendremos que aprender palabras nuevas, para comenzar a tener una mejor idea de los peligros que nos acechan. Todos tendremos que aprender que son las dioxinas y los furanos, aunque no hayamos estudiado química. En este sentido, la sociedad de la información de la cual tanto se habla, tiene que darnos una mano. No podemos ignorar los efectos súper tóxicos de dioxinas y furanos si apreciamos en algo nuestra salud y la de nuestra gente. Las dioxinas, cuyo nombre genérico es policloro dibenzo-p-dioxinas (PCDD) son el nombre con el que se conoce a un grupo de 75 compuestos formados por un núcleo básico de dos anillos de benceno unidos por dos átomos de oxígeno en el cual puede haber como sustitutos de uno a ocho átomos de cloro. La dioxina más estudiada y más tóxica es la 2, 3, 7, 8- tetracloro-dibenzo-p-dioxina, conocida comúnmente como TCDD. Los furanos cuyo nombre genérico es policloro-dibenzofuranos (PCDF) son un grupo de 135 compuestos de estructura y efectos similares a las dioxinas y cuyas fuentes de generación son la misma. Se considera que estos compuestos son los contaminantes principales de los policlorobifenilos (PCB). Cuando se hace referencia a las dioxinas y compuestos similares en los textos de divulgación se incluye también a los furanos y PCB. Las dioxinas y los furanos se forman de manera espontánea en un gran número de procesos industriales, principalmente de dos modos: como un subproducto de procesos industriales en los que interviene el cloro, por ejemplo en la producción del plástico PVC, de plaguicidas y disolventes organoclorados; y en segundo lugar, durante procesos de combustión de compuestos organoclorados, esto es que tienen carbono y cloro en su molécula, como ocurre en los incineradores de residuos peligrosos. La principal fuente de emisión atmosférica de dioxinas son los incineradores de residuos peligrosos y la principal fuente de emisión de dioxinas en el agua son las descargas de la industria papelera que usa gas cloro para blanquear la celulosa. Ambas fuentes de contaminación van a estar presentes en las futuras plantas de celulosa. Las dioxinas y furanos son muy tóxicos, activos fisiológicamente en dosis extremadamente pequeñas, persistentes, al no degradarse fácilmente, y pueden durar años en el medio ambiente. La principal vía de exposición para los seres humanos es la ingesta de alimentos contaminados, especialmente carne y productos lácteos. Pueden tener efectos negativos en el desarrollo neurológico, reproductivo, conductual y en el sistema inmunológico de lactantes y niños. Pueden provocar cáncer y otros efectos crónicos en personas adultas. Se carece de la capacidad de análisis especializada para determinar con seguridad la presencia de dioxinas y furanos en muestras biológicas y ambientales, por lo que no existen datos de la presencia de estos contaminantes en la población, el ambiente o los alimentos y no ha sido posible establecer niveles comparativos con otros países; sin embargo, el que no haya datos no quiere decir que los problemas de salud o medio ambiente que puedan ser provocados por dioxinas o compuestos similares no existan. Lo que fue una especulación hace algunos meses hoy se confirma. - Luego del río cruces ahora Celulosa Celco de Forestal Arauco va por el litoral para la descarga de sus desechos. - El lugar elegido sería la caleta Queule o Puerto Saavedra en la región de la Araucanía lo que podría poner en serio riego todo el territorio de las comunidades Lafkenche. Luego de la destrucción del santuario de la naturaleza en el río cruces, ahora la planta de celulosa Celco de empresa Forestal Arauco pretende descargar sus desechos a través de un ducto en la caleta de Queule, al sur de la región de la Araucanía. Ya las organizaciones Mapuche y ambientalistas en la IX Región lo habían anunciado en la movilización que se denominó ???Encuentro en la diversidad por la defensa de los derechos ambientales??? la que fue realizada en Temuco el pasado 9 de julio. Ahí se señaló la necesidad de defender el mar del la celulosa y el inminente peligro que vendría, previendo lo que se confirmaría días después. El cambalache: Ducto a cambio de Puerto. La propia gerencia de la Planta Celco reconoció recientemente la alternativa de llevar el ducto a la caleta Queule o las cercanías de Puerto Saavedra a cambio de ayudar en el financiamiento para la construcción de un puerto. Cabe consignar que la construcción de un Puerto en esta región ha sido uno de los temas que se viene incorporando en la agenda pública desde hace varios años y uno de los principales beneficiados con esta medida serían las propias empresas forestales quienes podrían sacar directamente sus productos de la zona para la exportación. La idea del ducto por el puerto fue confirmado por Charles Kimber, gerente Celco, que si bien fue escueto en señalar que se trata de una alternativa más, los antecedentes que han venido trascendiendo en los últimos días hablan de avances concretos en esta idea. Por ejemplo, ya se habría sostenido reuniones con organizaciones no marítimas en la zona de Queule y Toltén sobre el puerto y el ducto donde se ha dado a conocer las supuestas alternativas ???laborales??? y ???económicas??? que estas iniciativas generarían para su población. En el mismo contexto, el presidente de la corporación productiva CorpAraucanía, Lorenzo Dubois, ligado al sector forestal (Bosques Cautín) habría presentado a la gerencia de Celco hace dos semanas atrás una propuesta que contiene básicamente que la compañía podría transportar y verter riles hacia el mar por ductos que desembocarían en algún sector entre las zonas de Queule y Puerto Saavedra a cambio de participar en la construcción de un nuevo puerto marítimo en la zona. A esto hay que agregar inscripciones del subsuelo que sigilosamente vendría desarrollando la empresa, pensando seguramente en la futura construcción del ducto. Inminente desastre ecológico en Litoral Lafkenche. Aparentemente todo va dirigido para que las cargas del ducto de celulosa Arauco deban llevarlo las comunidades Lafkenche, ya que desde el sector donde se pretende llevar los riles es una zona casi exclusivamente de población de comunidades Mapuche habitantes de la costa la que se extiende continuamente hasta la zona sur de la Octava región. Cabe mencionar que en este último tiempo los Mapuche Lafkenche han reclamado una protección efectiva a sus recursos marinos en el borde costero, por lo que han sostenido siempre que los recursos naturales ahí tienen para ellos una multiplicidad de funciones, tales como el uso medicinal, agroecológico, artesanal, simbólico, cultural y religioso. Al respecto, también han señalado que la defensa del mar no se trata solo de resguardar equilibrios ecológicos, sino de garantizar de manera sustentable los recursos marinos principalmente por su contribución a la oferta alimentaría. Estos y otros aspectos estarían en inminente peligro de concretarse este proyecto en el litoral, principalmente por las corrientes marinas lo que ante una eventual contaminación de la celulosa podría expandirse en un amplio territorio con irreparables consecuencias para la vida de las comunidades.

    Pablo Ramírez Torrejón


    http://www.atinachile.cl/content/vie...a-y-Celco.html

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  • lechero total
    respondió
    Respuesta: Fallo de La Haya tema Botnia

    Originalmente publicado por Pio pio Ver Mensaje
    Dios no lo permita !!!
    el hambre...

    Originalmente publicado por FUJITIVO Ver Mensaje
    "No tenes codigos", "te cagas en los demas", "das pena", "bandita de desvirtuadores", "no vales ni estas palabras", "vos y tus secuaces", "no tengo tiempo que perder con vos", "todos uds que acusan", "manchas este hermoso lugar", "no participo donde vos estas", "no le haces bien a la convivencia del foro", "otro fenomeno más", "se metian para arruinarle la vida", "con el fin de arruinarle la familia", y hasta llegas al ridiculo de agredirme porque mi nick te hacer los ojos !!!

    Encima me das la orden de continuar por MP, porque mis miserias molestan a los demas, casi como si fueses el dueño del foro.

    No me sorprenderia que quien habla de falta de codigos, este buscando un baneo masivo de todos los foristas que irritan su campo visual, de hecho con lo que escribis estas buscando hace rato que alguien te insulte para lograr ese objetivo.

    Cuanto odio que tenes nene, evidentemente el metodo que usas para descargarlo no esta funcionando, deberias probar con un psicologo.

    Y agradecere que nos dejes seguir debatiendo sobre este tema.
    las ganas de comer...

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  • Avatar de Invitado
    Invitado respondió
    Respuesta: Aguante el Ades !!!!!!!!!

    Originalmente publicado por lechero total Ver Mensaje
    cuando hablaron mal del forista que no está mas no hablaban de botnia
    se metian con una persona para arruinarle la vida
    yo no maltrato a nadie, son todos iguales uds se Krispan como el jefe cuando alguien opina distinto
    pobre lalo que lo escupis al pedo ya que solo convalidó lo que yo dije que paso
    ya sabes que a vos tampoco te leo porque me duelen los ojos de solo ver tu nick con horror de ortografia
    seguila por mp porque los otros no tienen por qué leer tus miserias en letra chica
    "No tenes codigos", "te cagas en los demas", "das pena", "bandita de desvirtuadores", "no vales ni estas palabras", "vos y tus secuaces", "no tengo tiempo que perder con vos", "todos uds que acusan", "manchas este hermoso lugar", "no participo donde vos estas", "no le haces bien a la convivencia del foro", "otro fenomeno más", "se metian para arruinarle la vida", "con el fin de arruinarle la familia", y hasta llegas al ridiculo de agredirme porque mi nick te hacer los ojos !!!

    Encima me das la orden de continuar por MP, porque mis miserias molestan a los demas, casi como si fueses el dueño del foro.

    No me sorprenderia que quien habla de falta de codigos, este buscando un baneo masivo de todos los foristas que irritan su campo visual, de hecho con lo que escribis estas buscando hace rato que alguien te insulte para lograr ese objetivo.

    Cuanto odio que tenes nene, evidentemente el metodo que usas para descargarlo no esta funcionando, deberias probar con un psicologo.

    Y agradecere que nos dejes seguir debatiendo sobre este tema.
    Editado por última vez por FUJITIVO; http://www.escortsxp.com/foro en 07-05-10, 15:03:55.

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  • Avatar de Invitado
    Invitado respondió
    Respuesta: Fallo de La Haya tema Botnia

    Originalmente publicado por lechero total Ver Mensaje
    hacete cargo Kampeon! el que agredió a un usuario en problemas (con el fin de arruinarle la familia) fuiste vos
    atras del nick, bien de guapo como sos vos
    yo te dije que con vos no participo ni comparto opiniones

    Dios no lo permita !!!

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  • lechero total
    respondió
    Respuesta: Fallo de La Haya tema Botnia

    Originalmente publicado por Pio pio Ver Mensaje

    No agredas mas.
    hacete cargo Kampeon! el que agredió a un usuario en problemas (con el fin de arruinarle la familia) fuiste vos
    atras del nick, bien de guapo como sos vos
    yo te dije que con vos no participo ni comparto opiniones

    Dejar un comentario:


  • Avatar de Invitado
    Invitado respondió
    Respuesta: Fallo de La Haya tema Botnia

    Originalmente publicado por lechero total Ver Mensaje
    a quien llamas bandita de desvirtuadores?
    si estoy solito aca
    faltabas vos aparecer! otro fenomeno mas

    Che loco...de onda...dejate de joder y opina del tema...y si te parece que tu coeficiente intelectual es demasiado para mi, hacelo por todos los demas que estan opinando aqui con mucho criterio.

    No agredas mas.

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  • lechero total
    respondió
    Respuesta: Fallo de La Haya tema Botnia

    Originalmente publicado por FUJITIVO Ver Mensaje
    Yo no apareci, estoy debatiendo sobre este tema desde que empezo, y de hecho voy por 38 mensajes en el mismo.

    Para tu sorpresa la mayoria de esos mensajes hacen referencia al tema en cuestion (Botnia), hasta que de repente apareces vos con tu exceso de lactosa a maltratar a otro forista y a tratar de "desvirtuadores" a sus amigos (entre los que me incluyo).

    Y encima me preguntas a quien llamo bandita de desvirtuadores ?, Dejate de joder !!!

    cuando hablaron mal del forista que no está mas no hablaban de botnia
    se metian con una persona para arruinarle la vida
    yo no maltrato a nadie, son todos iguales uds se Krispan como el jefe cuando alguien opina distinto
    pobre lalo que lo escupis al pedo ya que solo convalidó lo que yo dije que paso
    ya sabes que a vos tampoco te leo porque me duelen los ojos de solo ver tu nick con horror de ortografia
    seguila por mp porque los otros no tienen por qué leer tus miserias en letra chica

    Dejar un comentario:

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